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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy ReseaRch WoRking PaPeR 4372
Given that public spending will have a positive impact 
on GDP if the benefits exceed the marginal cost of public 
funds, the present paper deals with measuring costs and 
benefits of public spending. The paper discusses one cost 
seldom considered in the literature and in policy debates, 
namely, the volatility derived from additional public 
spending. The paper identifies a relationship between 
public spending volatility and consumption volatility, 
which implies a direct welfare loss to society. This loss 
is substantial in developing countries, estimated at 8 
percent of consumption. If welfare losses due to volatility 
are this sizeable, then measuring the benefits of public 
spending is critical. 
   Gauging benefits based on macro aggregate data 
requires three caveats: a) considering of the impact 
of the funding (taxation) required for the additional 
public spending; b) differentiating between investment 
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and capital formation; c) allowing for heterogeneous 
response of output to different types of capital and 
differences in network development. It is essential to go 
beyond country-specificity to project-level evaluation 
of the benefits and costs of public projects. From the 
micro viewpoint, the rate of return of a project must 
exceed the marginal cost of public funds, determined 
by tax levels and structure. Credible evaluations require 
microeconomic evidence and careful specification of 
counterfactuals. On this, the impact evaluation literature 
and methods play a critical role. From individual project 
evaluation, the analyst must contemplate the general 
equilibrium impacts. In general, the paper advocates for 
project evaluation as a central piece of any development 
platform. By increasing the efficiency of public spending, 
the government can permanently increase the rate of 
productivity growth and, hence, affect the growth rate of 
GDP. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
Public spending influences output growth if it affects capital formation or productivity 
growth.  That impact may be direct or indirect.  The direct one is mediated by the 
effectiveness and efficiency with which spending is transformed into capital.  The 
policymaker and other stakeholders need to make operational the “efficiency” and 
“effectiveness” notions for different reasons. The policymaker has to choose among 
alternative projects and needs to gauge the impact of public spending on outcomes to 
make changes if the objectives are not being met. Other stakeholders will evaluate 
efficiency as part of their assessment of the delegation contract subscribed with their 
representatives to guide spending and taxation.  
 
The indirect impact of public spending on growth operates through people’s production, 
consumption and labor supply reactions to changes in relative prices and income derived 
from public spending variations.  Among these effects, those derived from the taxation 
needed to fund additional spending are of particular relevance, given the inseparability of 
spending decisions and taxation. From a macro standpoint, the inseparability arises from 
the requirement that fiscal policy be sustainable.  From the micro perspective, spending 
and taxation are not independent because the cost-benefit analysis of any public project 
is, essentially, a comparison of its expected social benefit with the marginal social cost of 
public funds, which is society’s cost of raising an additional dollar of public revenue.  
 
Besides its impact on capital formation, public spending may also affect productivity 
growth through changes in the efficiency of resource use.  In this respect, Arnold 
Harberger (2004) recently described the revolution he had witnessed in policymaking 
during the last four decades.  He noted how, on trade policy, the world had moved from a 
high-tariff protectionist environment toward a more liberalized trading system. On 
exchange rate policy, the free floating exchange rate and the monetary union paradigms 
had eased the action of market forces in determining the real value of currencies.  In 
monetary policy, independent central banks or monetary unions had significantly altered 
the ways in which countries managed their currencies.  On public expenditure 
management, however, he noted how most countries continued practicing it as several 
decades ago, with little regard for economic efficiency.  Among several reasons, he 
pointed to the lack of technical analysis in the measurement of costs and benefits in the 
practice of expenditure management.   
 
This paper examines the impact of public spending on growth and welfare, and discusses 
its effectiveness in achieving outcomes. The analysis can be done from a macro 
perspective or a micro standpoint.  While the macro approach concentrates on aggregate 
public spending and its welfare effects on society as a whole, the micro one focuses on 
the impact of specific programs on individuals or groups of them.  The methods and data 
sources for each are different. But both coincide in the need of clearly delineating the 
objectives of public spending and the requirement of measuring outcomes to assess 
whether the objectives were met or not.  In general, the paper endorses the proposal of 
expenditure evaluation and monitoring as a development platform.  
   3
Along these lines, the paper’s first two sections discuss macro and micro aspects of the 
impact of public spending on growth and welfare. The first section, on macroeconomics, 
explores the dual possibility of public spending affecting output via its impact on capital 
formation or other production inputs, or affecting directly society’s welfare. The first 
option, the “productive” aspect of spending, is the most explored in the literature that 
focuses on quantifying the productivity of public spending.  The section overviews the 
literature and highlights several challenges that policymakers face when drawing policy 
lessons from it.   
 
The second option, of public spending directly affecting welfare may come through 
different channels. The one generally explored in the literature derives from the provision 
of goods or services that are strictly utility-enhancing.  The paper abstracts from this 
channel, and focuses on people’s risk aversion and the impact that public spending has on 
the volatility of their consumption. Given the pervasiveness of volatility in developing 
countries and their vulnerability to it, the section highlights the association between 
public spending and the volatility of consumption.  Given people’s preference for smooth 
consumption, there is a substantial welfare loss in developing countries, setting an 
additional hurdle for any expected benefits derived from public spending.   
 
The second section, on microeconomics, focuses on the evaluation of public projects and 
the impact assessment of specific programs on capital formation.  Here too, spending and 
taxation are inseparable because economic efficiency requires that a project’s expected  
social benefit exceeds the marginal cost of public funds. Although in theory the economic 
efficiency criterion seems simple, in practice there are major challenges, especially 
quantifying the benefits of a program.  On this, the recent impact evaluation literature and 
methods can illuminate the way forward. For policy purposes, it is essential to be able to 
extrapolate results from individual program evaluations to other settings or to different 
scales of operation of it, highlighting the need of considering its general equilibrium 
effects.  This brings back the analysis to macro modeling and completes the evaluation 
cycle of the effect of public spending. 
 
II.  Macro Aspects of Public Spending 
 
This section focuses on the long run growth effect of public spending, and highlights 
caveats to bear in mind when drawing policy lessons from macro econometric work that 
quantifies the productivity of public spending. The particular long-run aspects 
highlighted in this section derive from the effects of public spending volatility on capital 
formation and household consumption. The first effect on investment has been explored, 
but the effect on consumption volatility has not. Given individual’s preferences for 
smooth consumption, this entails a direct welfare loss to society, quantified at substantial 
levels in developing economies.   
 
The section simplifies the analysis in many ways. For instance, it abstracts from the short 
run demand-side effects of public spending on economic activity; it also condenses 
critical discussions of the composition of public spending by considering a simple 
parameter, the elasticity of output with respect to public spending or public capital. Much   4
of the section is an overview of the challenges of measuring the productivity of spending 





A. Expenditure volatility impact on capital formation and welfare  
 
When public spending grows beyond the long-run sustainable funding level provided by 
taxation, it is subject to the volatility of financial markets. Though volatility may be 
cushioned by public debt management in the short run, in the long run disequilibria 
between taxation and expenditure lead to policy instability, as revenue or spending have 
to be adjusted.  This mismatch produces stop-go cycles of public spending, generating 
fiscal policy volatility that compounds economic uncertainty arising from other sources.  
Not surprisingly, Table 1 shows how public spending is more volatile in poor and heavily 
indebted countries that rely on external saving to close financial gaps.  Another 
interesting fact depicted in Table 1 is that volatility decreases as the income level rises, 
reaching a minimum in the subset of the European Monetary Union countries within the 
high income group.   
 
Not only is public spending volatility higher in absolute terms in less developed nations, 
but it is also larger relative to that of household consumption or GDP, as Table 1 shows.  
This fact by itself would not be problematic if it reflected active use of a policy 
instrument with the target variable (output or consumption) being stabilized.  In these 
circumstances, fiscal policy, and in particular public spending, could play a positive role 
within the tools disposable to the policymaker to stabilize output.  But the procyclical 
nature of fiscal policy in most developing countries, explored elsewhere (Alesina and 
Tabellini,2005; Talvi and Vegh, 2005), suggests that fiscal policy may be destabilizing.  
More importantly, and in the same direction, ther is a positive association between public 
spending volatility and output and consumption volatility as shown in Figures 1 and 2.
2
 
                                                 
2 Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the per-capita GDP and consumption per capita growth rates during 1961-2005.   5
 
Table 1 
Government Expenditure* Growth and Volatility across the World, by level of income 1961- 2005 
(growth rates) 
  Expenditure growth 
 (1)  (2)  (3)=(2)/(1) Volatility** relative to that of : 
  x   σ   σ / x  
Household 
consumption GDP 
Heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPC)  1.42  5.06  3.56  2.58  2.80 
High income  2.78  1.29  0.46  0.91  0.83 
European Monetary Union  2.87  1.25  0.43  0.66  0.70 
Least developed countries: 
UN classification  2.00  5.51  2.76  2.00  2.82 
IDA only  1.97  4.14  2.10  2.24  1.80 
Low income  5.25  4.52  0.86  2.27  2.25 
Middle income  4.60  2.91  0.63  1.58  1.72 
World 3.00  1.23  0.42  0.98  0.89 
*Refers to general government consumption expenditure 
** Standard deviation of government expenditure growth relative to the standard deviation in the growth of each variable. 
Output and consumption volatilities show different patterns in high income and low 
income countries.  The volatility of output and consumption is greater in lower income 
countries, and, consumption is more volatile than income in all countries except in the 
high income category (Table 1A).  Household consumption is extremely volatile in 
developing countries and that implies a substantial welfare cost for society.   
Source: Author’s calculations based on WDI. 
 
Table 1A 
Output and Consumption across the World, by level of income 1961- 2005 
(per capita growth rates) 
  GDP Consumption 
 (1)  (2)  (3)=(2)/(1) (4)  (5)  (6)=(5)/(4)  (7)=(5)/(2) 
  x   σ   σ / x   x   σ   σ / x   σ  con/σ  gdp
Heavily indebted poor 
countries (HIPC)  0.13  1.80  13.57 
-
0.25 2.06 -8.09 1.15 
High income  2.61  1.58  0.61  2.54 1.36 0.54  0.86 
Least developed countries: 
UN classification  0.44  1.93  4.43 
-
0.46 2.70 -5.90 1.40 
Low income  1.95  1.99  1.02  1.12 1.98 1.77  1.00 
Middle income  2.73  1.67  0.61  2.70 1.72 0.64  1.03 
World 1.92  1.38  0.72  1.81 1.12 0.62  0.81 
 
 
Source: Author’s calculations based on WDI 










































GDPvol= 2.48 + .21 FPvol
                           (8.13)
R2=.43       D.W.=1.98
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 










































Household Consumption and Fiscal Policy Volatilty
Consumvol = 2.32 + .45 FPvol
                                 (9.21)
R2= .49                D.W.= 1.76
 
Source: Author’s calculations 
 
Before quantifying the welfare loss associated with consumption volatility, we discuss 
the more direct impact of policy volatility on growth and capital formation. Fiscal policy 
volatility is systematically associated with higher output volatility; which, in turn, is 
associated with lower growth.
3  This relationship is stronger in poorer countries.  
Researchers have verified econometrically this negative association, estimating an almost 
one-to-one relationship: a one standard deviation increase in volatility (.75 percentage 
points) is associated with lower growth by .75 percentage points. (Fatas and Mihov, 2003 
and 2005)
 4 The effect of volatility on growth is mostly through its effect on capital 
formation, but the relationship has to be interpreted with caution as there is 
heterogeneous response across countries: the negative impact of volatility on growth is 
stronger in poorer countries with more underdeveloped institutions, and has become 
stronger through time (Hnatkovska and Loayza, 2003). 
 
                                                 
3 A survey of the research linking volatility with growth can be found in Loayza, et. al. (2007). 
4  Fatas and Mihov define the volatility of the discretionary component of public spending as the standard 
deviation of the residual of a regression of the growth rate of public consumption spending and the growth 
rate of output with other control variables including the country’s income level and time trends. They use a 
sample of 91 countries over 1960-2000.  The ranking of the countries by their volatility level using the 
Fatas-Mihov data (available in Fatas’ homepage) is very similar to the ranking obtained this crude measure: 
the rank correlation coefficient is .85   8
Policy volatility adversely affects investment, as evidenced from micro and macro 
analysis.   Firm-level data show that economic unpredictability and policy instability 
have a statistically significant adverse effect on expected sales growth (Chong and 
Gradstein, 2006)
5:  a one-level increase in policy instability decreases firm sales growth 
by almost 3 percent. At the country level, fiscal volatility is negatively associated with 
overall aggregate investment of the economy, confirming previous findings (Fatas-
Mihov, 2003). When investment is disaggregated to contemplate private investment only 
(the sample is reduced due to data availability), the negative association persists as Figure 


































Investment and Fiscal Policy Volatility
Inv = 22.82 - .19 FPvol
                     (-2.57)








































Private Investment and Fiscal Policy Volatility
Privinv = 15.53 - .21 FPvol
                           (-2.03)
R2= .05              D.W. 2.27
 
 
The “growth champions” have lower fiscal policy volatility, more efficient public sectors, 
and more centralized management of public finances. A recent survey of the growth 
process across the world in recent decades highlighted the experience of ten countries, 
labeling them the “growth champions”: China, Korea, Thailand, Singapore, Vietnam, 
Hong Kong, Indonesia, Ireland, Chile and Malaysia (Harberger, 2005).  Besides the 
commonalities analyzed by Harberger, namely the productivity increases and export 
performance, this group has other common traits related with fiscal policy: first, they 
have low volatility of fiscal policy; second, they have the highest scores of efficiency of 
the public sector (Afonso, Schuknecht, and Tanzi, 2006); and third, they have relatively 
centralized fiscal management, with the possible exception of China  This section deals 
                                                 
5 The World Bank Business Environment Survey asks firms to judge on a four point scale how problematic 
are the following four factors for operation and growth of their business: Policy instability (1) no obstacle; 
(2) minor obstacle; (3)moderate obstacle; (4) major obstacle.   9
with the first feature, namely the volatility of public spending, while the other two will be 
discussed in later sections.  
 
Public expenditure volatility is lower in the “growth champions”. Seven of the ten growth 
champions identified by Harberger are included in the Fatas-Mihov paper, and six of 
them rank below the mean indicator of policy volatility for developing countries.  An 
alternative measure of volatility
6 shows that the “growth champions” have lower fiscal 
policy volatility than the average group of countries (Figure 2). 
 
Policy volatility is directly associated with private consumption volatility.  The link 
between the government’s budget and household budgets results from the transfers made 
by the governments or the taxes paid by households.  Hence, volatility in the 
government’s finances is very likely to reflect in household finances, and hence on 
consumption decisions.  Effectively, there is a clear positive association between fiscal 
policy instability and household consumption volatility. Simple linear regression 
indicates that almost 50 percent of the household consumption volatility is explained by 
public expenditure volatility (Figure 3).
7  
 
Consumers generally prefer smoother patterns of consumption, especially when it is close 
to subsistence levels, and they would be willing to sacrifice some amount of consumption 
to obtain a less risky consumption path.  The amount that households are willing to 
sacrifice will depend on their tolerance to risk (degree of risk-aversion), and the amount 
of risk to which they are subject.  The magnitude of consumption that households are 
wiling to forgo to obtain a more stable consumption level is the welfare cost of 
consumption volatility and reaches an astronomical 8% of consumption per year, on 
average, in the sample of developing countries considered in this paper (Table 2 and 
Appendix 1). For African countries the average is slightly higher, at 9%, while for Latin 











                                                 
6 To enlarge the sample and update the original Fatas-Mihov work , volatility was defined as the standard 
deviation of the growth rate of per capita public spending in each country in the period 1960-2005.  The 
volatility ranking is very similar to that of Fatas and Mihov (the rank correlation between both orderings is 
.85), suggesting that the crude volatility measure we chose will not be biased by variables such as the 
income level.  Ongoing work explores this possibility more rigorously. 
7 This figure is very similar to the Fatas-Mihov (2003) R
2 estimates for the relationship between output 
volatility and fiscal policy volatility.  To capture the possibility of endogeneity of fiscal policy volatility, 
Fatas-Mihov use an instrumental variables method wich does not change the statistical significance of the 




  Table 2 
Costs of Output and Consumption Volatility*. 
 Output  Consumption 
Egypt .004  .007 
Lesotho .041  .272 
Mauritius .000  .004 
Morocco .116  .160 
South Africa  .027  .033 
Tunisia .011  .010 
Uganda .016  .044 
Zimbawe .154  .680 
    
Argentina .194  .244 
Brazil .013  .137 
Chile .036  .048 
Colombia .023  .055 
Costa Rica  .026  .047 
Ecuador .039  .061 
Mexico .040  .069 
Nicaragua .022  .408 
Venezuela .211  .174 
    
Australia .001  .003 
Canada .012  .009 
Denmark .004  .012 
Finland .042  .037 
France .003  .004 
Germany .004  .005 
Ireland .030  .019 
Italy .001  .010 
Japan .004  .003 
Spain .003  .007 
U.K. .004  .008 
United States  .004  .005 
    
China .011  .018 
India .015  .016 
Indonesia .095  .072 
Korea .054  .140 
Russia .230  .138 
S. Arabia  .028  .027 







































  *percentage increase in output or 
consumption producing a welfare gain 
equivalent to that achieved by reducing 
volatility to the global average 
Source: Author’s calculations 
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For policy purposes, it is critical to determine the causes of fiscal volatility.  Most studies 
conclude that the variables are related to political institutions and the constraints on the 
decision-maker (Fatas-Mihov, 2003, 2004 and 2005).  However, Figure 3A highlights 
that higher spending is positively associated with higher volatility.
8  The positive 
association can be refined further by noting that there are two distinct groups of 
countries:  the first, composed mostly of the OECD and East Asian economies, show a 
positive relationship between the variables, but volatility is significantly lower for any 
level of expenditure growth; Chile and South Africa are included in this group.  The 
second group, composed mostly of Latin Amercan and African economies, also shows a 
positive association between the level and the volatility, though much steeper.  In this 
case, higher expenditure is associated with more volatility, increasing at faster rate than 





                                                 
8  Policy is defined as as the growth rate of government spending per capita (1961-2005) while volatility 
refers to the standard deviation of the series.  Gali (1994) presents a real business cycle (RBC) model in 
which larger government size (measured by the tax and spending ratios to GDP) is associated with higher 
output volatility.   12
 
If between 40 and 50 percent of the total welfare cost can be attributed to public 
expenditure volatility
9, the resulting cost has to be contrasted with the potential benefits 
of public spending to determine the overall benefit to society of public spending.  Even 
further, knowledge of how this welfare cost is distributed across members of society is 
necessary because the supposed beneficiaries of public spending could be 
disproportionately bearing the loss induced by volatility.  If risk tolerance decreases with 
wealth, as evidence suggests (Ogaki, et. al. 2001), then the poor will bear most of the cost 
of volatility. Additionally, to compensate for risk, the poor will self-insure by choosing 
activities with low rates of return but smaller variance.  They will change their production 
and savings decisions to compensate for increasing risk (Morduch, 1995; Jalan et.al, 
2001), in ways that reduce their income and, hence, perpetuate poverty.  More analysis of 
how societies do risk-sharing along the lines of Townsend (1994) for India  and Ogaki 
et.al (2001) for Pakistan, would be beneficial. For the moment, these estimates indicate 
an extremely high aggregate cost of volatility, requiring high benefits of spending to 
compensate for that welfare loss.  
 
Hence, gauging the growth impact of additional spending, as well as other impact on 




B. Public expenditure, outcomes and growth at the macro level: 
Where is the chain’s weakest link? 
 
This section discusses the assessment of the relationship between public expenditure and 
growth, intermediated by the effectiveness of public spending in affecting outcomes such 
as educational attainment, the number of paved road kilometers, or the kilowatts of 
electricity delivered to users.   Recent literature surveys by the IMF (2005) and the World 
Bank (2007) exemplify the high ambiguity about the relationship between public 
expenditure and growth at the macroeconomic level. On one hand, the IMF survey 
reports that “empirical evidence on the impact of public investment on growth remains 
mixed” and that “their [infrastructure projects] impact on GDP growth is more uncertain. 
Empirical studies that have tried to estimate such impact have yielded widely different 
results…. Empirical ambiguity over links between spending and growth has also been 
shown to exist for other types of expenditure...” (IMF 2005, pg. 13).   On the other hand, 
the World Bank survey states that “…though some non-robustness remains in the 
evidence, this largely applies to studies before 2000. … a number of recent papers reverse 
the earlier findings, and now find strong positive growth effects from public capital 
spending.  [list of papers] show that sectors usually regarded as productive (transport and 
                                                 
9 Based on the percentage of the variance of household consumption volatility explained by public 
expenditure volatility (R
2 of the regressions presented in figures discussed in the text and footnote 5).  This 
assumes that policy volatility is exogenous with respect to consumption volatility, based on the 
instrumental variables estimation of Fatas-Mihov (2003) referring to output volatility.  This work is yet to 
be done for consumption volatility, but similarity of the country rankings by volatility between the Fatas-
Mihov papers and this paper’s, suggests results will not be radically different.   13
communications, education, health, etc.) have significant positive long-run growth 
effects…” (WB, 2007 pg. 42-43) 
 
The ambiguity of results is not surprising, as the relationship between public expenditure 
and growth is mediated by a long chain subject to multiple weak links that are not 
necessarily the same across countries, or even across expenditure programs within the 
same country.
10    This section examines the links between public expenditure and capital 
formation with particular attention to three topics: 1) the need of considering the link 
between expenditure and revenue, given that the additional funding will have an impact 
on growth; 2) the necessity of differentiating spending flows (investment) and capital 
stocks; 3) the importance of recognizing heterogeneity in output responses across 
countries, across types of infrastructure, and across levels of network development.  The 
above considerations will require a more detailed analysis but will provide a more useful 
diagnosis of the role of spending on growth. 
 
1.  The impact of additional funding to finance more spending 
 
Regardless of the productivity of expenditure, both the policymaker and the economic 
analyst must consider the budget constraint, that is, how the additional expenditure will 
be funded.  It is essential to include in the analysis of public investment the cost to 
society of raising an additional dollar to pay for more spending.  This will be discussed in 
the next section, and momentarily, the focus is the distorting effect of the tax system and 
its negative growth effect.  The impact of productive expenditure on growth will depend 
on the relative productivity of the private sector vis. a vis the public sector, on the size of 
the productive expenditure, and on the size of public sector.  Both the size of public 
spending and public debt matter because they imply higher taxation levels which entail 
increasing more than proportionately the marginal cost of public funds. Appendix 2 
summarizes a simple analytical model that shows how, unless public expenditure is 
extremely productive relative to the private sector and public debt is quite low, increasing 
taxation to fund productive expenditures will have a negative growth impact. 
 
From the econometric viewpoint, the above consideration implies imposing a restriction 
when estimating the impact of expenditure on output.  Otherwise regression models 
would be mis-specified (Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell, 1999; Bleaney, Gemmell, and 
Kneller, 2001). Recently, many papers have estimated the growth impact of different 
types of spending (productive and unproductive) jointly with alternative forms taxation 
(income taxes vs. consumption taxes). Two good recent examples can be found in Adam 
and Bevan (2005) and World Bank (2007). 
 
These studies have several common features and results: 1) they are panel studies, though 
covering different samples;
11  2) both studies consider public investment (instead of 
public capital)  in a category labeled “productive expenditure” that also includes health 
                                                 
10 The analogy of the chain with weak links is original from Filmer, et.al (2000) that analyze the 
relationship between public spending and health outcomes.  
11 The Adam-Bevan paper includes 45 non-OECD countries, while the World Bank sample is limited to 21 
countries of eastern Europe and Central Asia;   14
and education spending; 3) both papers show that an increase in unproductive 
expenditures is associated with lower GDP growth rates, while productive expenditures 
are marginally significant with a positive growth effect; 4) the  impact of taxes is 
unambiguously negative and significant
12, with the magnitude of the coefficient similar 
to the elasticity of output with respect to productive expenditure.   
 
For policy purposes the main lesson is to consider jointly the effects of both spending and 
taxation on economic growth.  The signs and magnitudes of the  tax and expenditure 
variables in both studies cited above, indicate that both effects offset each other when 
dealing with productive expenditures, but in the case of unproductive expenditures the 
effect will be unambiguously negative.  These results explain why many countries that 
instituted generous pension benefits in the past, and have had to reduce productive 
spending or raise current taxes to pay those liabilities, experience slower growth, such as 
Brazil, Uruguay, and Colombia. 
 
2.  The difference between investment (flow) and public capital (stock) 
 
Besides considering the effect of the additional resources required to fund spending, 
policymakers must bear in mind that growth and welfare depend on the flow of services 
provided by capital, rather than on spending itself.   The services, in turn, are better 
approximated by the capital stock, while investment spending is associated with changes 
in it.  Hence, the amount of investment that actually is transformed into public capital, or 
the efficacy of investment, is an essential element to incorporate in the measurement of 
the impact of public spending on growth or estimations of the rate of return of public 
spending.   Initially, in the area of infrastructure, researchers were limited by data 
availability on capital stocks and public investment. Hence, researchers inferred the 
efficacy of public investment from aggregate macro data and results indicated that 
between 40 and 50 percent of investment was incorporated into physical capital, with 
great variability across countries (Pritchett, 1996 and 2000).
13   
 
These findings have clear analytical and policy implications.  From the analytical 
viewpoint, the ineffectiveness would explain why some studies don’t find a relationship 
between public investment and growth.  When simulating the growth impact of changes 
in public capital spending it would be advisable to include some measure of the 
effectiveness of investment (Agenor, et. al. 2007).  From the policy standpoint, changes 
in public capital spending are not linked one-to-one with changes in output.  In terms of 
                                                 
12 In the Adam-Bevan paper, while in the WB paper the tax coefficient is negative and significant in three 
out of 4 cases 
13 Pritchett estimated the efficacy of investment based on a growth accounting exercise. He estimated the 
rate of capital accumulation that would be consistent with a “true” Total Factor Productivity (TFP) growth 
of between 0 and 1 % per year.  This “implicit” rate of factor accumulation would be compared with the 
observed rate of capital accumulation.  Generally the implicit rate would be much smaller than the observed 
rate, leading Pritchett to conjecture that recorded (actual ) figures overestimated the real capital 
accumulation due to the low efficacy of investment. Efficacy fluctuated between 8% and 95%, depending 
on the TFP benchmark (0 or 1%) and the region, with Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia exhibiting the 
lowest efficacy and the high performing Asian economies reaching (95%).  The OECD average fluctuated 
between 74% and 98%.    15
policy advice, it would be inappropriate to conclude that a specific country increase 
public spending in roads because a cross-country panel regression coefficient is high, or 
to conclude that the country should cut spending because the regression coefficient is low 
or non-significant. 
 
More recent studies, based on new datasets and more sophisticated methods, estimate the 
efficacy of public investment in the range between 40 and 50 percent.  Data on 
infrastructure stocks across countries (Canning 1998, 1999) and of public investment in 
infrastructure (Calderon and Serven, 2003 ) facilitated estimation of public capital stock 
series.  Some researchers opted for considering the accumulation of past investment as a 
proxy for changes in public capital, while others correlated the information in both 
datasets. A complete and rigorous study shows that, in developing countries, the 
perpetual inventory method (PIM) is a poor approximation of the function that relates 
public investment and physical capital: estimations indicate that only 38 and 40 cents of 
every investment dollar is transformed into public capital.  For instance, Figure 4 shows 
the estimated relationship between investment and capital stocks in the roads sector in 
Colombia, and Figure 5 depicts the same relationship for overall investment in Mexico.  
Both cases show the tenuous relationship between one and the other.  In developed 
countries the same approximation is almost identical to what the PIM would produce, 
reflecting high efficacy of investment. Figure 6 shows the close approximation between 
investment in roads and (changes in) capital stocks in the United States (Arestoff and 
Hurlin, 2006).  
 
Figure 4 
Non-Parametric Estimated Efficiency Functions of Sectorial 
Public Investment. Colombia, 1980-1994 (US$ million, current prices) 
Roads 
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Figure 5 
Non-Parametric Estimated Efficiency Function of Total 
Public Investment. Mexico, 1980-1994 (US$ million, current prices) 
 




Non-Parametric Estimated Efficiency Function of Public Investment 
in Streets and Highways . United States, 1951-1992 (US$ million, Historical Cost) 
 
 
Source; Arestoff and Hurlin 2006 
 
The efficacy of public spending is also a challenge in the formation of human capital as 
evidenced in education, nutrition, and health programs. In education, the resources that 
reach the student are not necessarily the same that leave the central budget office.  For   17
instance, public schools in Uganda received only 13 percent of the central government’s 
allocation for non-wage expenditures, with the leakage depending on the size of the 
school and the wealth of the families in the particular district. When the scool transfers 
were published in local newspapers and schools were required to publish the inflow of 
funds, the leakage reduced substantially to 10 percent (Reinnika and Svensson, 2001).   
In nutrition, programs targeted to ensure children’s intake of minimum nutritional 
elements are also subject to leaks.  In Peru, the Vaso de Leche (Glass of Milk) program 
oriented to ensure children’s intake of calcium and protein was considered a success until 
a World Bank Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (World Bank, 2002) found that the 
beneficiaries (children under six) received 30 cents for every dollar spent by the central 
government. Private gains and high operational costs of the public sector explained the 
leakage of funds.  
 
The health sector also registers weak links between public spending and health outcomes 
that have been explored comprehensively across numerous counties (Filmer, et.al., 2000). 
The pioneering study in this area showed that inadequate institutional capacity and 
allocation of budgets to the activities in which market failures are not that big limit the 
potential impact of public spending on improving health outcomes. The authors showed 
that, when conditions were not serious or quality was not important, patients would 
choose public facilities.  But for serious conditions, individuals were willing to pay for 
private higher-quality care, bypassing the public service provider. 
 
Improving service delivery for human capital formation is more difficult than in physical 
capital because outcomes are observable only with long lags and it is difficult to monitor 
the work effort by service providers. This limits the option of linking pay to performance 
and suggests that, in many circumstances, to improve service delivery policymakers will 
have to rely more on individual choice in a setting involving a proper mix of public and 
private provision of services. Generalization to a uniform standard of private sector 
participation is impossible, as there are a constellation of possible arrangements 
depending on whether the service is homogeneous or not, on the communities 
preferences, and on the monitoring feasibility. In general, the more heterogeneous is the 
service, and the higher the difficulty in monitoring outcomes and work effort, the more 
involved will local governments have to be. If the service is more homogeneous, the 
central government may be involved. In both cases, the extent of private provision will 
depend on monitoring capabilities (World Bank, 2003) 
  
3.  Is all capital equally productive?  
 
1.  Human capital 
 
The output response to additions of human or physical capital will vary with its quality 
and productivity. This heterogeneity helps explain why the macroeconomic literature 
based on aggregate figures finds ambiguous results on the impact of public investment or 
capital on growth.  This section examines the sources of heterogeneity in human and 
physical capital, and discusses its implications for policy. 
   18
Measures of human capital in most growth regressions, including literacy rates, 
enrollment ratios or the average years of schooling, are unreliable proxies for human 
capital because they do not incorporate the rate of return to education nor the quality of 
education.  The most commonly used proxy for human capital is the number of years of 
schooling. The simple aggregation ignores that rates of return vary with the education 
level and that schooling systems may deliver different skill levels in the same time 
period, depending on their quality  When human capital is adjusted to include these two 
effects, results consistently confirm the crucial role of human capital in explaining 
development differences across countries: cross-country differences in the stock of 
human capital account for one half of the dispersion in economic development level 
across the world, and for practically all the differences across the OECD countries 
(WoBmann, 2003).  However, the measure of human capital depends critically on 
varying rates of return to education and quality of education adjustments.
14
 
Recent estimates of the rate of return to education fluctuate around 10 percent, though 
dispersion across regions and countries is large.  While the average rate in developing 
countries is 11 percent, in the OECD economies it is only 7.5 percent (Psacharopolus and 
Patrinos, 2004: Patrinos, et.al. 2006).  Rates of return also vary for primary, secondary 
and higher education, showing a decreasing trend as the level progresses from primary to 
more advanced levels. Social rates of return also vary with the country’s income level: 
for instance, primary education rates of return in low income countries average 21%, in 
middle income countries around 19%, and in high income counties about 13%. Rates of 
return also vary across income groups within the same country: returns to education for 
the bottom quantile of the income distribution are 3 percentage points higher than for the 
top one in a sample of East Asian countries, while in Latin America they are 5 percentage 
points lower (Patrinos, et.al, 2006). 
 
The variability of rates of return suggests potential pitfalls of working with country 
average rates and might explain the contradiction between the micro literature showing 
consistent returns of education with the earlier macro literature showing almost no 
relationship between education expansions and growth. Pritchett (2001, 2006) argued that 
deficiencies in the institutional setting accounted for cognitive skills being directed to 
unproductive activities, rendering negligible average effects of education on growth. This 
hypothesis is verified in growth regressions that include interaction terms between 
educational variables and institutional proxies such as openness of the economy or 
indicators of the rule of law (Hanushek and WoBmann, 2007). 
 
Another critical element in measuring human capital is the quality of education.  Growth 
regressions that include both the typical education quantity indicators (years of 
                                                 
14 Dessus (2001) estimated a neoclassical growth model with a heterogeneous elasticity of output with 
respect to human capital across countries.  The elasticity was a function of several variables that 
approximated the quality of education system, including the school infrastructure, the inequality in school 
achievement across different groups of society, and the pupil/student ratio. Results indicate that human 
capital is an important factor explaining cross-country differences, once heterogeneity in the school quality 
was allowed to operate. Hannushek and WoBmann (2007) also consider inequality in the distribution of 
education quality across income groups reaching similar conclusions.   19
schooling) and the more novel quality of education indicators
15 substantially improve the 
explanatory power of the model.  Additionally, the quantity indicators turn out 
statistically insignificant (Hanushek and WoBmann, 2007). Recognizing the limitations 
in the use of standardized testing as proxies for the quality of education, it is essential to 
explain how to achieve improvements in the quality of education.  This leads us to public 
expenditure and institutional issues. 
 
The literature, in general, shows that additional public spending is not necessarily 
associated with improved education outcomes (Pritchett 2001, 2006;  Hanushek and 
Kimko, 2000).  Hanushek and WoBmann (20007) corroborate these results using the 
quality of education indicators for a sample of OECD and non-OECD economies.  The 
authors verify graphically and with linear regression the absence of a relationship 
between educational spending per student and student performance measured as the math 
test scores in the PISA 2003.  Though these results were robust for both the average 
OECD country and the non-OECD, it is legitimate to ask whether they are valid for an 
enlarged sample including more developing countries and whether policy design should 
be based on average behavior. 
 
When the sample is enlarged to include more developing countries, the association 
between public spending and quality of education for the average country remains 
insignificant and may even turn negative.  The comparison across countries of such a 
diverse nature deserves caution.  For instance, there is a clear positive association 
between the GDP per capita level and the test scores, as Figure 7 shows. Similarly, there 
is a positive association between public spending in education and GDP.  When both 
scores and educational spending are controlled for GDP, the negative association emerges 
for the average country as Figure 8 shows. 
 
However, for policymaking purposes, working with the best-practice cases may be more 
informative and useful than working with average behavior.  This is especially relevant 
when adopting a production-function approach to education that relates inputs (spending) 
and outcomes (education attainment).  In this case, what is of interest is the maximum 
expected output for a given input level, or alternatively, the minimum amount of input 
required to achieve a determined output level. The countries that obtain the highest scores 
per unit of public spending (best-practice cases) are considered the most efficient and 
constitute what is known as the efficiency frontier, depicted in Figure 9. The other 
countries’ efficiency is estimated as the distance with respect to the frontier. When the 
relationship between public expenditure and quality of education is cast in these terms, an 
efficiency frontier emerges. Instead of a negative association, a step-wise linear function 




                                                 
15 The indicator is based on results form cognitive achievement tests, such as the TIMSS, the PISA and the 
PIRLS among others. 
16This method is called the Free Disposable Hull (FDH) method.  A similar technique, Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) can also be used to examine efficiency. Appendix 3 presents a discussion of efficiency 
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Source: Herrera and Pang (2006) 
 
These empirical measures of efficiency, based on ratios of observed output levels to the 
maximum that could have been obtained given the inputs utilized  date to the 1950s 
(Debreu, 1951;  Farell, 1957) and have recently been used to estimate the efficiency of 
public spending on health and education (Gupta and Verhoeven, 2001;  Afonso et al. 
2004; Herrera and Pang,  2006) The focus of the recent work in these two sectors is due 
to their relative importance within public budgets and to the availability of cross-country 
data to perform the benchmarking.  These studies use aggregate spending on health or 
education as an input, jointly with other inputs such as the adult literacy rates, the ratio of 
teachers to pupils, or the amount of private spending, to obtain efficiency frontiers for 
education or health.  The efficiency frontiers estimated in this fashion are used to 
benchmark the efficiency levels of the other countries. For instance, in the case of 
secondary enrollment, Bulgaria and Korea appear on the frontier ((Figure 9A), while 
countries like India and Uganda show that, given their expenditure levels, secondary 
enrollment rates are 47 percent and 13 percent of the most efficient countries. Peru scores 
78 percent. (Herrera and Pang, 2006). 
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Source: Herrera and Pang (2006) 
 
 
In terms of policy implications, it is vital to differentiate between the technically efficient 
level and the optimal or desired spending level. Even if a country is identified as an 
“efficient” benchmark country, it may very well still need to expand its public spending 
levels to achieve a target level of educational or health attainment indicators. Such is the 
case of countries with low spending levels and low attainment indicators, close to the 
origin of the efficient frontier.  The important thing is that countries expand their scale of 
operation along the efficient frontier. 
 
This measure of technical efficiency, unfortunately, has nothing to say about the optimal 
spending level. It simply states benchmarks of costs per unit of output, focusing on doing 
things right (at the lowest possible technical cost) but an important consideration is if it is 
doing the right things.  This benchmarking method necessarily has to give way to 
analysis with more economical content Hence the discussion has to move to estimation of 
social benefits and costs, as well as causal inference, topics covered in the next sections.  
 
The above discussion illustrates the point that policies that simply provide more resources 
will not necessarily improve education outcomes; it is imperative to examine other links 
of the chain.  Teachers are key inputs in the production function and account for most of 
the cost of education. In both developed and developing nations teachers’ unions have   23
contractual arrangements that are not conducive to monitoring performance.  Though 
there is some evidence that performance-related pay leads to improving achievement 
(Atkinson, 2004; Vegas and Umansky, 2005, Duflo, et.al. 2005), it is not fully understood 
what constitutes high-quality teaching plus the difficulty in monitoring behavior might 
lead to improper behavior, such as the cheating documented by Jacob and Levitt (2003) 
in the Chicago school system.  Other behavior frequently observed in developing nations 
is that of teacher absenteeism. Countries where absenteeism is more prevalent (Table 3 ), 
such as India and Uganda, ranked  lower in terms of efficiency scores estimated in 
educational attainment, while those with lower absenteeism, like Peru, ranked higher 





  Percentage of teachers that were absent this many times in 2 visits 
(3 in India) 
  0 1 2  3 
Bangladesh 73.4 23.5  3.2   
Ecuador    82.8 6.9 10.4  
India  49.1 32.7 13.5  4.8 
Indonesia 67.7  27.5  4.8  
Peru 81.0  17.3  1.7   
Uganda 63.0  29.6  7.4   
Note: Interpretation of the figures. 73.4 % of the teachers in Bangladesh were never absent; 23.5 % were 
absent once, and 3.2 percent were absent twice. 
Source:  Chaudhury, et.al.  
 
 
Without an adequate institutional setting, educational spending will lead to negligible 
changes in human capital and hence on growth. A package of institutions or policies that 
would provide this institutional setting would: 1) promote more competition so that 
parental demand generates incentives to individual schools; 2) allow autonomy in local 
decision makers so that school mangers promote student achievement; and 3) develop an 
accountability system so that rewards are based on school performance (Hanushek and 
WoBmann, 2007). 
 
2.  Physical capital  
 
In the case of physical capital (infrastructure), studies show that its growth impact 
depends on its quality and is heterogeneous owing to multiple factors: different types of 
physical capital, differences in the stage of network development, differences through 
time (Calderon and Serven, 2004; Hurlin, 2006; Colletaz and Hurlin, 2006).  Different 
types of capital will have distinct effects on output.  For instance, roads and railways will 
not have necessarily the same impact on output.  Similarly, a single road with no 
connections will not have the same impact as one interconnected with the main highway 
system. These differences in the determinants of capital productivity are seldom   24
incorporated in econometric exercises.  Initially, to allow the possibility of differing 
productivities across countries, researchers split their samples in poor and rich counties, 
with a resulting small and insignificant elasticity of output for the lower income group 
(Canning and Benathan, 2000).   That outcome was obtained with a simple (and 
restrictive) Cobb-Douglas production function that imposes a constant and homogeneous 
(per each group) elasticity of output with respect to public capital.  Using a more flexible 
functional form (translog), that captured non-linearity by introducing quadratic terms and 
interaction between variables, the authors obtained elasticities that varied with the level 
of income (Canning and Benathan, 2000)  
 
Figure 10.   
 
 
Source: Canning and Benathan (2000) 
 
 
The non-linearity and heterogeneity in the response of output to physical capital may 
arise from sources different than the countries’ income level.  The countries’ relative 
intensity of factor utilization (capital per worker) may be the differentiating variable. In 
particular, the stage of network development may be the source of heterogeneity in the 
output response to additional public capital. If this were the case, the arbitrary 
classification of countries into predetermined categories imposes (incorrect) restrictions 
in the estimation.  A more flexible approach would allow endogenous classification of 
countries into groups according to the stage of network development, with possible 
switching from one group to another when endogenously determined threshold levels are 
achieved.  This approach has been applied to both samples of OECD countries (Colletaz 
and Hurlin, 2006) and developing economies (Hurlin, 2006).  The main implication is 
that productivity is allowed to vary by type of capital, by the particular stage of network 
development, and through time.  
 
This flexible approach applied to a sample of OECD economies yields interesting results, 
with the advantages that it facilitates comparison with well-known results and the quality 
of the data may be more reliable (Colletaz and Hurlin, 2006).  Using individual country   25
time series (ignoring the panel dimension), the authors obtained very high elasticities of 
output with respect to capital: .39 for the United States, identical to Aschauer’s (1989) 
pioneering result.  Australia, France and Germany also register values of .4 or above. 
These estimates imply rates of return of public capital of over 100%.
17  By now, the 
literature recognizes that this result is explained by multicolinearity and reverse 
causation.   
 
These limitations were overcome by exploiting the panel dimension and using 
instrumental variables or GMM methods, leading to lower estimates of the productivity, 
but still implying rates of return higher than economic analysis of projects would indicate 
reasonable (discussed in the following section). However, when the estimation method 
allows for heterogeneity across countries depending on the level of infrastructure network 
development, the estimated elasticity falls to between 6 and 9 percent in the US, France, 
Germany, Canada and the UK while Italy and Australia are in the 10 to 14 percent range.  
 
The non-linear effect of infrastructure on output is verified when the sample is extended 
to include developing countries (Hurlin, 2006).  In addition, by differentiating between 
types of capital, i.e. roads, electricity, telephones and railways, much more flexibility is 
added.   However, it becomes more difficult to specify a value for the productivity of 
public capital.  For roads, the productivity of capital in early stages of development is 
around 6 percent, increases to 8 percent in the next stage of development, and then 
decreases until reaching 3 percent in the most mature stage. In electricity, the 
productivity parameter starts quite low, at 4 percent, increases quickly to 10 percent and 
remains about that level. In telephone, the elasticity begins at a very high 18 percent and 
decreases very gradually until about 16 percent in the last stage. The elasticity of output 
with respect to railway development starts at a low3 percent and increases slowly to 5 
percent.  
 
The critical lesson from the verification of the network effects is that establishing 
priorities for the capital spending program depending on the level of network completion 
is  critical to maximize the growth impact of a given expenditure level.  Additionally, 
though, historically, increases in particular infrastructure development could have been 
associated with growth spurts, those episodes may be unrepeatable if the network reached 
full completion and the productivity of additional capital is close to zero.  As an example, 
consider the growth boost sparked by the building of the interstate highway system in the 
US during the 1950’s and 1960’s that is deemed unrepeatable because of the fall in the 
productivity in road infrastructure (Fernald, 1999). 
 
Considering heterogeneity in the efficiency of resource use goes beyond the econometric 
implications discussed above, as there are other revealing comparisons in the efficiency 
and effectiveness with which countries use the resources.  Even tasks that apparently 
                                                 
17 Gramlich (1994) showed this with a modified production function expressing output (Q) as a function of 
private capital (K), labor (L) and government capital (G). If Q=A F (K,L, G), then the elasticity of output 
with respect to public capital, e, would be equal to FGG/Q, where FG is the marginal product of the factor, 
or the rate of return. With G/Q estimated around 40%, the elasticity of.4 yields a rate of return of around 
100%.   26
depend on simple engineering principles, such as water and electricity distribution, reveal 
great heterogeneity in the efficiency and effectiveness in the use of resources.   Given the 
association between indicators of coverage of infrastructure services and poverty (Fig. 
11), it is essential to increase access to electricity and water across the world. In the case 
of electricity, both coverage levels and progress have been uneven across regions (Table 
4), and, in general,  there is much to be achieved.  
 
Figure 11   
Electricity Access and Poverty Rates across the World 
 




Electrification Rates by Region, 1970-2005 
 
 1970  1990  2005 
 
North Africa  34  61  96 
Sub-Sahara Africa  9  16  26 
South Asia  17  32  52 
East Asia/China  30  56  89 
Latin America  45  70  90 
Middle East  36  64  78 
Developing Economies  25  46  68 
Transition Economies and OECD      100 
World 49  60  76 
Source:  IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2002, 2006.   27
Though part of the solution resides in capacity expansion, an integral approach must 
include reduction of transmission and distribution losses.  These are different across 
countries and regions. In Africa, where the coverage ratio is the lowest, the losses reach 
astronomical levels, particularly in Congo, where the losses are equivalent to the full 
value of consumption, and Nigeria where they reach 53%, as shown in Table 5 and 
Figure 12.  Other cases of large losses are Venezuela (38%) and Ecuador (61%).  South 
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Source: calculations based on IEA data   29
 
Some countries expanded electricity generating capacity with little progress in increasing 
the access of the population to electricity, while others that increased capacity moderately 
but had low losses were able to expand coverage.  Within the African continent there are 
striking contrasts.  For example, Tanzania expanded generating capacity at an annual 
average rate of 8% during 2000-2004, but access to electricity remained constant (Table 
6).  Tanzania’s loss rate is 32%. Ghana increased its installed capacity at an annual 
average growth rate of 22 %, while it coverage rose modestly by 4 percentage points.  On 
the other extreme, South Africa’s generating capacity rose by 1 percent, but coverage 
increased the same 4 percentage points, thanks to the low loss rates. India and Pakistan 
present an interesting contrast. While both have similar low loss rates and capacity 
expanded at the same rate, India increased coverage from 43% of the population to 56%, 




Where did the Electricity Go?  Electrification Rates and Percentage Annual Increase in 
Installed Capacity in Selected Countries, 2000-2005 
 






in installed capacity 
Ghana  45 49 22 
Kenya 8  14  13 
South Africa  66  70  1 
Tanzania 11  11  8 
India   43  56  4 
Pakistan 53  54  4 
Indonesia 53  54  2 
Thailand 82  99  8 
Vietnam  76 84 11 
Guatemala  67 79 17 
Source:  IEA, WEO 2002, 2006. 
 
It is also imperative to reduce losses in the water sector, where utilities in developing 
countries register physical and commercial losses equivalent to 35% of the total input; in 
developed nations the loss ratio is only 15% (Table 6A).  The monetary cost of these 
losses will depend on the marginal cost of water and the average tariff charged, but 
conservative estimates of the loss suggest that it is around  US$14 billion.  The 
magnitude of the estimate is appreciated when compared to the estimated US$20 billion 
required to invest every year to reach the MDG for basic access to potable water in 
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Table 6A- Estimates of non-revenue water (NRW) across the world 
 
Source: Kingdom, Liemberger, Marin (2006) 
 
In water and electricity delivery, what appears as an engineering problem really is a more 
complex phenomenon involving lack of maintenance resources and inadequate systems 
of incentives and accountability of management, staff and politicians (World Bank, 
2004). Managers are risk averse, and prefer asking for more resources or closing financial 
gaps by cutting maintenance.  Since there is no “ribbon-cutting” and pictures in 
newspapers, politicians are not interested in loss-reduction programs, and engineers may 
find more challenging designing new plants and expansion plans than fixing underground 
pipes.  Reducing losses also generally involves unpopular activities such as cutting 
service to some users. Field staff also faces inadequate incentives in deciding their work 
effort when assigned to loss-reduction activities, as finding illegal connection may be 
dangerous for them, as well as maintaining inefficiency of this kind provides an 
opportunity to profit from corrupt practices.  Hence, association with the private sector 
under the new performance-based service contracts is an alternative that has worked well 
in several places, such as Dublin, Sao Paulo, the state of Selangor (Malaysia) and 
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III.  Microeconomic Aspects of  Efficient Public Spending  
 
Governments typically spend between 20 and 30 percent of GDP on goods and services.  
If they could increase the efficiency of the use of these resources, on a year by year basis, 
the impact on GDP would be substantial.  The natural problem is defining and measuring 
efficiency, discussed in this section in two parts:  a) allocative efficiency and the rate of 
return of public projects and programs; b) impact evaluation.  
 
A. The rate of return of public projects 
 
Besides doing things right (technical efficiency), the government has to allocate resources 
to the right things (allocative efficiency).  If governments allocate their scarce resources 
to different activities based on the principle that the project’s social rate of return exceeds 
the marginal social cost of public funds, and projects with the larger net social benefit are 
prioritized, then the project will have a positive impact on GDP.  In practice, the 
comparison of benefits and costs must contemplate project specificity.  This section 
discusses some of the factors that account for heterogeneity across projects, causing the 
threshold rate of return for efficiency to vary.  It also shows some of the challenges that 
policymakers face when using rate of return estimates to guide their decisions. 
 
1.  Relationship with the marginal cost of public funds  
 
Spending and taxing decisions are not independent because the marginal cost of public 
funds is a necessary element in the evaluation of public projects and programs.   Since the 
decision rule is to undertake a project or program if the marginal social benefit exceeds 
the marginal social cost of public funds (Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2001), then, estimating 
the marginal cost of funds is as important as estimating the benefit of projects.  Public 
spending necessarily implies raising taxes, now or in the future. But taxation alters 
society’s consumption and production decisions.  Both the composition and levels of 
production and consumption bundles end up being different than they would be in the 
absence of taxation. Hence, society’s welfare changes as a result of tax variations. The 
monetary value of the welfare change per unit of revenue raised is the marginal cost of 
public funds. 
 
The shadow price of a dollar of public revenue is higher than 1 because, in addition to the 
dynamic efficiency costs described above, the government incurs administrative costs to 
collect taxes, which fluctuate between 1 and 4 percent of total tax collections (Gallagher, 
2005: Warlters, et.al. 2005). Also, there are compliance costs that private agents incur to 
meet their lawful obligations, but there are no quantifications of this cost.  Hence, each 
dollar of revenue collected by the government costs more than one dollar to society.   
 
Most estimates of the marginal cost of funds are for developed nations, with relatively 
few calculations for developing countries. Estimates vary widely, according to the type of 
tax considered, the country, and the specific model used for the calculation. For instance, 
for the US, estimates range from 1.5 (Jorgenson et. al., 1990) to 2.7 (Feldstein, 1997).  In 
developing countries, figures fluctuate from 1.5 for Cameroon to 2.2 in Bangladesh   32
(Devarajan et. al. 2001).  For China, the sales tax deadweight loss estimate is 2.3 (Laffont 
et.al., 1997), while for India it ranges from 1.6 to 2.1 (Ahmad and Stern, 1987). Recent 
estimates for a large sample of African countries (Warlters et.al. 2005) indicate a range 
from 1.05 to 1.37. The details on estimating this cost are reviewed elsewhere  (Devarajan, 
et. al., 2001) and for the discussion that follows,  the important fact to bear in mind is that 
the marginal cost increases more than proportionately with the average tax rate.  In fact, 
the welfare cost increases quadratically with the average tax rate (Stiglitz, 1988), which 




Given this range of estimates for the marginal cost of public funds, the natural question is 
what this implies for public expenditure evaluation and decision rules.  Bevan (2007) 
presents a useful framework (summarized in Appendix 4) to analyze the required rate of 
return for various kinds of projects.  To be efficient,  a project’s marginal social benefit 
must exceed the marginal cost of public funds,  and the level of the required rate of return 
that meets the condition will depend on : 1) whether the specific project will require 
general tax revenue or will it be financed by user charges; 2) the extent to which the 
government will be able to appropriate some of the benefits of the project; 3) the values 
of some parameters such as the marginal cost of public funds, the recurrent expenditures 
generated by the project, and the rate of discount.  For the average values of these 
variables considered originally by Bevan, the required ROR varies between 10 and 14 
percent, judged to be a reasonable back-of-the-envelope estimation of a benchmark 
range.  
 
This range spans a space of possible rates of return by considering variability in some of 
the main determinants. One of the elements that vary considerably with the type of 
project is the recurrent costs ratio (c).  For instance, in a sample of World Bank projects, 
recurrent costs fluctuated from about 1 percent in energy projects to over 7 percent in 
education projects. In a sample of ADB projects, the highest recurrent cost ratios, of 
about 7 percent, were for health projects (Hood, et.al. 2002).  More disaggregated studies 
report even higher recurrent cost ratios: roads fluctuate from 3% to 14%, general 
hospitals and urban health centers around 18 percent, and primary and secondary schools 
range from 6 percent to 70 percent of investment costs (Heller, 1982).  Another source of 
variability is the rate of discount that projects might use.  While health or environment 
projects might use low discount rates (in the 3 percent range), infrastructure projects 
might use discount rates towards the higher end of the spectrum. In addition, the MCF is 
different across countries, and as it rises, so will the rate of return required for economic 
efficiency.  Additionally, the dimensionality of the problem increases if you consider that 
these variables might change through time.  Table 7 shows different required rates of 
return that vary with the marginal cost of funds, the discount rate, and the recurrent cost 
ratio.  These variables define the space of action of the public sector to have a positive 
                                                 
18 The welfare cost of taxation, or the burden of taxation, will also depend on the relationship between the 
marginal tax rate and the average tax rate, which reflects the progressivity of the tax system.  These 
complications are not treated here.  Niskanen (2003) presents a short discussion with some back-of-the-
envelope calculations for the US economy.   33
impact on GDP.  This constellation of rates define the fiscal space of action for the 




Required Rates of Return for Alternative 
Rates of Discount (r), Recurrent Cost 
Ratios (c), and Marginal Cost of Funds 
(MCF) 
  
Project pays for itself (no taxes) 
     r    
    0.03 0.05 0.09 
c       
0.03  0.06 0.08 0.12 
0.05  0.08 0.10 0.14 
0.12  0.15 0.17 0.21 
         
         
Project needs full tax financing 
         
MCF = 0.15      
     r    
    0.03 0.05 0.09 
c       
0.03  0.07 0.09 0.14 
0.05  0.09 0.12 0.16 
0.12  0.17 0.20 0.24 
         
MCF = 0.25      
     r    
    0.03 0.05 0.09 
c       
0.03  0.08 0.10 0.15 
0.05  0.10 0.13 0.18 
0.12  0.19 0.21 0.26 
         
MCF = 0.4      
     r    
    0.03 0.05 0.09 
c        
0.03  0.08 0.11 0.17 
0.05  0.11 0.14 0.20 
0.12  0.21 0.24 0.29 
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2.  The observed rate of return of public programs and projects  
 
Obtaining historical information on the rate of return of public spending is a difficult 
task, but the data limitation may be partially overcome by considering a sample of public 
projects financed by the World Bank in recent decades.  In spite of the limitations of this 
sample, derived from its small size in relation to public spending in each country and 
possible selection bias discussed below, there are interesting facts of the rate of return 
during the period 1980-2004.  The observed rate of return of public spending changes 
through time and falls within the ranges estimated in the previous section. Naturally, this 
refers to the median of the sample for each year, and there is much variability across 
sectors and regions (Herrera, 2005).  While the economic rate of return fluctuated 
between 12 and 14 % during the eighties, there is an upward trend during the nineties to 
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The upward trend in the rate of return of public spending is associated with a more stable 
macroeconomic environment.  During the nineties, there was a generalized opening of 
trade and improvement of fiscal positions that are associated with better project 
performance.  Different studies show that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between the macro environment and project performance (Isham and Kaufmann, 1999; 
Herrera 2005).  This fact reinforces the point that fiscal policy does not act in a vacuum, 
and better project outcomes will be achieved in settings in which markets are left to 
operate so that prices are effective signals of fundamentals. 
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The median rate of return of about 20 percent seems high, despite the positive effect of 
improved macroeconomic fundamentals during the nineties.  Though there might be a 
few public projects that have such rates, or even higher, it seems very unlikely that the 
typical public project yields this result (Harberger, 2005; Devarajan, et.al., 1997). If the 
typical public project or program produced these results, then almost any public spending 
would have a positive impact on GDP.  Though estimates obtained from this database 
may reflect problems specific to it, probably the determinant ones, discussed below, may 
be applicable to the practice of cost-benefit analysis of public projects in other settings. 
 
First, the portfolio has a high variability, with a standard deviation of around 20 percent.  
Hence, there are many bad public projects that the median-based analysis does not 
incorporate. The same program may have positive results in one location but negligible 
ones in a neighboring one.  Program design and implementation are critical, and they are 
likely to change from one location to another, and through time. Finally, the median is 
unweighted, treating alike both small and big projects providing limited information on 
the overall return of public spending. 
 
Second, there might be a selection bias if governments choose projects with the highest 
rate of return to seek funds from international organizations. Though the evidence for this 
hypothesis is not compelling, there are claims of different rates of return for projects 
funded by outside donors and those funded from the national budget (Devarajan, et.al. 
1997).  Other indirect evidence of the “cream-skimming” hypothesis would be the 
finding of rates of return on projects funded with EBRD resources systematically higher 
than those financed by the World Bank. In turn, projects funded by both institutions 
registered higher rates of return than those funded with EU cohesion funds (Florio, 1999).   
 
And third, the data reveal an “optimism bias”, as ex-ante (at appraisal) rates of return are, 
on average, higher than ex-post (at completion) rates.  The bias is not constant, varying 
across regions and sectors, with projects in the urban development and infrastructure 
sectors showing the highest bias. The optimism bias is not exclusive of this database, as it 
has been detected some time ago (Harberger, 1997). The UK Treasury’s guide to project 
evaluation, The Green Book, refers to this problem and proposes methods to incorporate 
the bias in project analysis, and the appraisal of EU Cohesion-funded projects seems to 
have similar problems (Florio, et.al. 2004).  These results indicate that the profession 
needs to improve on the practice of evaluating the benefits of programs and projects, 
which leads to the following section.   
 
B. Impact evaluation -  the quest for more evidence-based economic 
analysis and policymaking 
 
The previous section revealed the need of exploring deeper the cost and benefit 
estimation of traditional project evaluation.  Economic analysis of projects would benefit 
from paying more attention to specifying the counterfactual, which would allow 
comparing the benefits from the program with those under an alternative scenario 
(Devarajan, et.al., 1997).  This would reduce the optimism bias and lead to more credible 
evaluations and hence, better policies. The recent impact evaluation methods play a   36
fundamental role in this process. This section briefly presents the method, summarizes 
some results from case studies directly related to capital formation, and finally presents 





An impact evaluation assesses changes in an outcome indicator (education attainment, 
health, income level, or well-being) of individuals, households, communities, or firms, 
that can be attributed to a particular project, program or policy. The central impact 
evaluation question is what would have happened to those affected by the intervention if 
they had not in fact been affected by it.  Since this is unobservable, the key challenge is to 
specify a counterfactual – that is, to select a group which is as similar as possible (in 
observable and unobservable dimensions) to those affected by the intervention.  This 
comparison allows assessment of causality – attributing observed changes in the outcome 
indicator to the program, while removing confounding factors. 
 
There are alternative methods to specify the counterfactual, that is, the selection of the 
comparison group that will be used to measure the impact of the intervention.  Which 
method is chosen will depend on numerous considerations, such as the type of project, 
the evaluation question, the time constraint, data availability. The methods have different 
advantages and disadvantages that have been reviewed and presented in detail elsewhere 
(Baker, 2000 and Ravallion, 2001, 2005). Here, just an intuitive summary follows.  
 
The core of impact evaluation is to select a comparison group, which should be identical 
(or as similar as possible) to the treatment group, with the key difference that the 
comparison group did not benefit from the program.  The design of the comparison group 
is oriented to control for any bias due to differences in observable characteristics 
(schooling, geographic location, participation in the labor market, etc.) or unobservable 
ones (skill, motivation, connections, etc.) between the two groups. There are alternative 
methods to assign individuals into the treatment (beneficiary or affected by the 
intervention) and control (unaffected by the intervention) groups.  
 
The first method, randomization, allocates the intervention randomly among eligible 
beneficiaries.  The random selection of treatment and control groups ensures there is no 
bias, and hence, it is considered the most robust evaluation method. The disadvantages of 
the method emerge from the likelihood of its applicability due to the political 
circumstances that enable to select randomly beneficiaries for a program, or to ethical 
considerations that allow the policymaker to deny treatment to somebody that actually 
needs it. The method is also inapplicable in projects that have national coverage due to 
the impossibility of selecting a comparison (no-treatment group).  This method is also 
known as an experimental design of the evaluation. 
 
Other methods, known as non experimental, generate the comparison group that 
resembles the treatment group through econometric techniques.  The selection into the 
                                                 
19 This section draws on material presented in more detail in the impact evaluation website of the World 
Bank, on the Handbook on this topic (Baker, 2000), and several papers by M. Ravallion.   37
groups is generally done after the intervention. The most common approaches are the 
matching method, the double difference method, and the regression discontinuity method.  
The matching method attempts to match the comparison to the treatment group based on 
observable characteristics.  The idea is to select as a comparison group those with the 
same probability of participation in the program. The limitation of this method arises 
from the assumption that there is no unobserved heterogeneity, that is, there is no bias 
arising from unobserved factors. The double difference method overcomes this limitation 
by comparing the differences between the treatment and comparison groups (first 
difference) before and after the program (second difference). The limitation of this 
method arises from the assumption that the bias arising from unobservable factors 
remains constant through time. Finally, the regression discontinuity method may be 
applied when a program is assigned based on a specific threshold which produces 
discontinuity in the participation (individuals participate or not) but the individuals just 
below the threshold are identical to those just above the threshold. 
 
2. Public expenditure and capital formation- results from some impact 
evaluations 
 
Most impact evaluations have centered on quantifying the impact of policies on human 
capital formation (education, nutrition and health) while relatively fewer studies have 
analyzed the impact of infrastructure or the impact of policies on building assets.  This 
section describes some results of different evaluations that highlight the importance of 
public programs on capital formation.  
  
There have been numerous evaluations performed on the policy impact on human capital 
formation, and currently the World Bank (2007b) is undertaking a project to extract 
lessons from several evaluations of a specific type of program
20.  Here the focus will be 
in the Mexican Progresa-Oportunidades, because it was the first program of its type, and 
the positive results of the evaluation (Skoufias, 2005) have led to its extrapolation to 
other countries (Brazil, Colombia, Bangladesh, Australia adopted this type of program for 
indigenous peoples, and New York City started one too) (World Bank, 2007b).  
 
With variations, these programs transfer cash to poor families, conditioned on their 
undertaking certain actions to build up human capital of their children.  Generally, these 
actions entail ensuring school attendance, visit to doctors and intaking a minimum 
amount of a nutritional supplement.  The transfer is an incentive to build up human 
capital and, hence, is expected to alleviate long-run poverty. The program also has a 
short-run effect on poverty through the cash transfer income itself.  However, the cash 
transfer may also affect negatively the beneficiary’s labor supply on two counts: the 
income effect of the transfer will increase demand for consumption and leisure; and a 
substitution effect that may divert time towards meeting the program conditionality. 
 
The Progresa impact evaluation shows positive results of the program (Skoufias, 2005).  
On the education side, the program led to an increase in school attendance for boys and 
                                                 
20 The specific type of program is the conditional cash transfer, or CCT, described below.   38
girls in secondary and high school level (ages 12 to 17), with the effect being larger in 
girls: while boys attendance increased by 8 %, that of girls rose by 14%.  There was no 
impact of the program in younger ages, probably due to the fact that school attendance 
for those ages was already high prior to the program.  This led to a reallocation of 
resources of the education grant towards high school aged participants.  In terms of 
health, Progresa reduced the incidence of illness for 0-2 year olds and 35 year-olds. In 
terms of nutrition, Progresa led to higher growth and reduction in the probability of 
stunting in children 12-36 mos.  The evaluation indicated that labor market participation 
had not been affected by the program (Skoufias, et.al, 2007).  This particular result may 
not be generalized, as impact evaluations of other programs show that the labor supply 
effect of transfers is significantly negative, as in the case of a rice subsidy in Sri-Lanka 
(Sahn et.al. 1996).  It would be interesting to compare both cases to understand the 
different response of labor supply to the transfer.  
 
A major puzzle remaining from this evaluation is the lack of impact of the program on 
learning scores (Skoufias, 2005).  If the quality of education is the critical component in 
human capital, as argued in previous sections, it is legitimate to question the impact of 
the program even if more children went to school.  There are not many evaluations of 
impact of policies on learning scores, but there are a few that are worth highlighting.   
One of the better known cases is the Colombia voucher program (an in-kind transfer and 
not a CCT), probably due to the method used (randomization) and because the cognitive 
tests were administered 4 years after the initiation, considered a long-enough lag to 
observe learning results (Angrist, et. al. 2002).  The problem with the evaluation was that 
the sample was very small (aimed only at a specific cohort of students that applied in a 
specific year) and that the test was specifically designed for the evaluation and hence 
might have been perceived as an academic exercise.   Results showed an increase in 
learning scores of .2 standard deviations of program participants. In a posterior 
evaluation, researchers were able to match program applicants with their college entrance 
examinations (seven years after their application to the program).  All the previous results 
were verified with a much longer lag and a larger sample (Angrist, et. al.2006).  Another 
impact evaluation shows a positive response of learning scores to changes in the teacher 
remuneration system that reduced absenteeism in India (Duflo et.al 2006).   
 
Besides the impact on human capital formation, some evaluations have also analyzed the 
impact of transfers on family savings and investment in productive assets.  Another 
evaluation of the Mexican Progresa (Gertler. et. al , 2006)  showed that five years after 
the program, rural household beneficiaries had invested in farms and in microenterprise 
activities. Increased investment in productive activities generated a permanent increase in 
income that allowed an increase in consumption of 34%. 
 
This reaction of beneficiaries is not generalized; rather, the measured effects of public 
spending depend upon program design, on individual’s preferences, in particular their 
risk-aversion, and on the timing of the evaluation. A contrasting example to the Mexican 
case is a public program in China evaluated 5 years after program initiation (Ravallion 
and Chen, 2005), and then 5 years after the program completion (Chen, Mu and 
Ravallion, 2006). The program, implemented in 1,800 villages on south-west China, had   39
two components: one that was expected to affect equally all households, consisted in 
improving infrastructure such as rural roads, power lines and piped water. The other 
component was a loan to households to finance initiatives to raise farm yields, animal 
husbandry, and tree planting.  The medium term evaluation, based on household surveys 
five years after the program initiation, showed that incomes had risen but consumption 
did not change. The long term evaluation, based on survey data of 5 years after program 
completion (10 years after program initiation), showed that the permanent income of the 
households had not changed and neither had consumption. Whether these results can be 
interpreted as evidence of the permanent income hypothesis of consumption, as the 
authors did, or evidence of extreme risk aversion of the poorest households, is debatable. 
The main lesson is that program design will affect the outcomes and must consider the 
beneficiaries’ preferences and constraints to anticipate their reaction to the public 
program. 
 
The role of public spending on physical capital formation, and its consequences for 
welfare and poverty, has not been explored extensively using impact evaluation methods.  
Curiously, the cost-benefit analysis of these projects registers the highest difference 
between ex-ante and ex-post rates of return in projects funded by the World Bank 
(Herrera, 2005).  Similarly, the UK Treasury pinpointed capital expenditures as the 
largest source of optimism bias in public investment projects, and identified as its causes 
the poor definition of the objectives of the project and the poor identification of 
stakeholder requirements (UK Treasury, 2003).  On both counts, identifying the projects 
objectives and identifying stakeholders, the impact evaluation methods can shed much 
light.  
 
Only until recently have some infrastructure projects involved impact evaluations. Some 
examples are in the area of water and sanitation (Poulos, et.al, 2006.), in urban transport 
(Boarnet, 2006), in rural roads (van de Walle, 2006), and in dams (Duflo, 2005). These 
evaluations have in common that they focus on two key issues: endogeneity of placement 
and the distributional consequences. For instance, the urban transport project evaluation 
incorporates the fact that city dwellers adjust their location and travel patterns partially 
based on public transport considerations. More motivated and employable people might 
choose to live near the transport route, and hence ex-post evaluations that find that people 
living next to the project have higher employment rates must take that into consideration.  
In the case of dams, the evaluation incorporated the fact that these are placed depending 
on the regions’ wealth and was able to identify the counterfactual group with geographic 
characteristics. The evaluation showed the different impact of dam construction in the 
own district and the downstream district: agricultural output increased downstream and 
poverty fell, while in the districts where the dam was built poverty increased. The 
evaluation showed a net present value of 1 percent, without considering the deadweight 
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3. Lessons from impact evaluations 
 
All evaluation methods have advantages and disadvantages.  While there are advocates of 
specific evaluation methods (i.e. Duflo, 2004), others propose a flexible approach so that 
the evaluation can be adapted to the problem, to the setting, and to the availability of data 
(Ravallion, 2005).  Regardless of the position in the debate, the underlying assumption is 
that the average treatment effect is something useful for the policymaker when 
considering scaling up or extrapolating results from evaluations.  
 
When attempting to extrapolate results from a specific evaluation, the policymaker must 
be aware of some common problems to most evaluations.  The first one, the publication 
bias, refers to the preference of researchers and editors for statistically significant results.  
The bias has been well documented in empirical research in economics, and other fields 
such as medicine and social science (De Long, 1992; Stanley, 2005).  Hence, published 
results must be interpreted with caution as the impact of the intervention will tend to be 
overestimated. In the particular area of evaluation there is not much evidence of the bias. 
However, a study that compared different evaluation methods found that papers reporting 
“no-impact” results were always easier to replicate with all the methods, while the 
positive impact results were difficult to replicate.  Additionally, papers using popular 
evaluation methods, the non experimental type, also registered a higher impact than 
studies using the experimental approach, by a margin that could be as high as 10% of the 
income of the target group (Glazerman, et.al. 2003).
21 The potential for this bias has led 
some researchers to advocate for institutions to ensure that the negative results are 
systematically disseminated (Duflo, 2004).  
 
A second problem that may affect evaluations of the impact of policies is that the agents 
being tested (treatment group), or the control group, may change their behavior 
transitorily due to the assessment being performed.  Due to the increased attention or the 
fact that beneficiaries are receiving something during the assessment, individuals may 
receive a temporary boost to their motivation, which will bias results toward s finding a 
positive impact of the intervention (this is called the Hawthrone effect).  The control 
group may also react to not having been included in the program and may boost 
performance to compensate for the fact (this is the John Henry effect). It is important that 
the evaluation take into consideration these effects. For instance, instead of having two 
groups (treatment and control) a third one can be added that receives some benefit, 
though not as effective as the experimental intervention being tested.  
 
A third factor to consider when extrapolating results from an evaluation, especially for 
scaling up a program, is its general equilibrium implication.  It is essential to consider the 
individuals’ incentives and reactions to the program.  For instance, if a small scale school 
voucher program (like the Colombia case) were to be scaled up, that would affect the 
functioning of the whole school system in ways that will completely alter results.  For 
instance, if schools are provided with incentives to improve outcomes, and they are 
allowed to choose their students, they will react by being more selective (“cream-
                                                 
21 These results refer only to impact evaluations of programs to increase earnings incomes of target groups. 
However, the Galzerman et.al. paper is the only published paper that has done this analysis.   41
skimming”) which will lead to different test scores between private and public schools.  
Schools will also tend to spend more money in what parents value more, such as having 
good looking infrastructure, but that not necessarily improves academic achievement.  
The Chilean case provides evidence of how voucher programs led to higher school 
segregation with little impact on learning scores but higher parent satisfaction due to the 
increased choice (Hsieh and Urquiola, 2003).  
 
The scaling up of programs to the national level may affect relative prices and may 
require additional taxation. Both effects mitigate the impact of the original policy, leading 
to an overestimation of benefits based on partial equilibrium analysis.  For example, a 
massive educational program will affect educational skill composition of the labor force, 
which in turn will lower skill premiums and affect the wage structure.  When the general 
equilibrium considerations of a tuition subsidy program include the effect of the 
additional taxation required to finance the scaling up, the overestimation of the effects 
may reach up to 10 times the general equilibrium impact (Heckman et al., 1998).  Other 
comparisons of benefits estimated in a general equilibrium setting versus a partial 
equilibrium analysis, indicate that the overestimation of the impact due to ignoring the 
relative price changes and the subsequent  household adjustment to them is extraordinary, 
ranging from 4 to 10 times the more realistic impact (Sieg, et.al., 2000).
22 The necessity 
of considering the general equilibrium highlights the complementarity of detailed micro 
evaluations with more structural economic modeling (Bourguignon, 2004). 
  
The fourth element to be considered when extrapolating results is that the institutional 
context determines the magnitude of the impact.  One program can have impacts in one 
location but not in another.  The Food for Education assessment in Bangladesh (Galasso 
and Ravallion, 2005) showed that the program’s results were correlated with observable 
village characteristics.  These observable characteristics reflected features of the local 
decision-making process. For instance, the anti-poverty program had less impact in 
villages with greater inequality, or that were more isolated.  Inequality led to targeting of 
expenditure towards different groups that would not benefit as much, while isolation 
probably reduced the perceived accountability of local decision-makers. 
 
 
IV.  Political Economy of Government Expenditure   
 
This very brief section acknowledges that institutional factors, both related to electoral 
institutions and to budgetary processes, will affect the size, predictability, composition, 
                                                 
22 The Sieg et. al. paper does not refer explicitly to public spending, but to a policy aimed at achieving  a 
cleaner environment.  The partial equilibrium estimation of the benefit involved comparing willingness to 
pay (WTP) measures in a community before and after the policy was in place.  However, this method 
ignores that people can choose to move from one community to another, in response to the cleaner air.  
People will tend to relocate to the communities with cleaner air, leading to rising housing prices in those 
communities, and vice versa in communities with lower air quality.  Additionally, the households will not 
be the same (they have different preferences) in a community in the two distinct points in time (before and 
after).  Considering the differences in preferences and incomes that the different household compositions 
imply,  the willingness to pay measures that incorporate changes in housing prices reveal much lower 
benefits.    42
and the extent of evaluation and monitoring of public spending. These were the topics 
discussed in previous sections from a technical standpoint and it would be naïve to 
conclude the paper without recognizing the role of political economy in determining 
these outcomes. 
 
Rather than thinking in terms of controlling political indiscipline, it may be more 
constructive to consider the types of institutions that will improve the quality of 
decisions, recognizing that politicians have different incentives and horizons than 
technocrats. Politicians have allegiances with specific geographic constituencies, but also 
with national social groups (Milessi-Ferreti, et.al.2003).  And how will they be held 
accountable by both depends on the political competition and accountability rules that the 
electoral system defines.  
 
Electoral rules will affect public spending to the extent that they affect political 
competition and accountability.  Under the plurality rule system (majoritarian rule) the 
candidate with the largest number of votes wins a seat in parliament.  This system 
maximizes individual political accountability, and hence tends to reduce the size of 
spending and waste or the ability of politicians to extract rents. However, it will reward 
politicians for channeling funds to specific regions and will affect the composition of 
spending in favor of goods or services that are more easily targeted towards specific 
groups at the expense of broad or more universal spending programs.  The reverse will 
happen in proportional representation systems, in which candidates are drawn from 
national party lists and are elected based on shares of total voting.  This system reduces 
individual accountability and evidence shows a positive association with higher 
corruption and waste (Persson, Tablellini and Trebbi, 2000). Evidence also shows that 
proportional systems tend to spend more on transfers or the universal good, while 
majority rule systems spend more on goods or services that are easier to target 
geographically (Milesi-Ferretti, et.al, 2003). 
 
At the center of this discussion lies the common pool problem in public budgeting: 
general tax funds are used to finance projects that benefit particular groups of individuals 
that perceive the full benefit of a project but only a fraction of the cost.  Hence, 
institutions that facilitate the internalization of the entire budget constraint by politicians 
and decision makers would lead to better fiscal outcomes. In this sense, the fragmentation 
of the budget has to be minimized, and fragmentation occurs in different instances: 1) 
when there are off-budget items; 2) when there is indexation of spending or entitlements 
with parameters fixed by law; 3) when there are mandatory spending laws or revenue 
earmarking laws; 4) when the use of contingent liabilities and public guarantees affect 
future budget allocations and take precedence over future decisions (Von Hagen 2002). 
 
Because spending predictability and efficiency require sustainable policies, it is crucial to 
balance between delegation and representation.  Delegation refers to the power or 
authorization to an agent to act as a “fiscal entrepreneur”.  Evidence shows that 
centralizing expenditure decisions in the ministry of finance is associated with positive 
fiscal outcomes (Alesina, et.al. 1999 ) Similarly, the  “growth champions” identified in   43
the first section of this paper have in common centralized fiscal systems.  However, 
adequate representation is required for sustainability.  
 
Given the high welfare cost associated with fiscal policy volatility, it would be beneficial 
to consider what kind of institutions would make policy more predictable.  Both fiscal 
and electoral institutions have an impact on fiscal outcomes and on public spending, and 
it would be useful to examine why the EU countries have lower expenditure volatility.  
While some researchers focus on the role of electoral institutions (Person et al. 2007 and 
2005), others concentrate on the budgetary process and fiscal institutions (Von Hagen, 
2002).  Though there is in general a positive assessment of fiscal rules, this is still a 
matter of debate.  For instance, adjusting fiscal variables for the business cycle to focus 
on the structural fiscal balance or the discretionary component of fiscal policy seems 
impeccable from the theoretical standpoint.  But, in practice, ex-post evaluation of the 
cyclical adjustments in the EU countries shows that the output gap is systematically 
underestimated, leading to more expansionary fiscal policy (Ley, 2006; Vidal, 2007). If 
the economists’ toolkit leads to these systematic mistakes in developed nations, it is 
legitimate to ask about the validity of its application in developing countries. Some 
propose complementing existing rules by setting expenditure growth ceilings, but this too 
is subject to debate (Von Hagen, 2005).  What is needed is national consensus on the 
importance of reducing fiscal volatility.  This is also crucial for ensuring efficiency of 
public spending.  
 
  
V.  Conclusions  
 
Public spending has the potential of affecting capital formation and GDP.  If the specific 
project meets the economic efficiency criterion, it can help remove “growth bottlenecks” 
or mitigate consequences of market failures.  But public spending is also subject to 
failure and society incurs costs because of spending. These derive mainly from the 
distortions arising from taxation or from the volatility induced to household consumption.    
 
Expenditure decisions are not independent from taxation.  From the micro standpoint, 
taxation levels determine the marginal cost of public funds, which is the minimum 
threshold for a project’s rate of return for it to satisfy economic efficiency criteria. If 
public resources are allocated to projects that satisfy this requirement, and spending is 
prioritized based on the projects’ rate of return, then public spending will have a positive 
impact on GDP. 
 
From the macro viewpoint, prolonged spending expansions beyond the stable funding 
source of taxation expose expenditure to the volatility of financial markets.  Not 
surprisingly, public spending is more volatile in highly indebted less developed 
economies. The stop-go cycles of expenditure induce volatility to household consumption 
that imposes welfare costs for society, estimated at the equivalent of 8 percent of 
consumption per year in developing economies.  The burden of this cost is most likely 
borne by the poor, which have subsistence consumption levels and lower tolerance to 
risk.     44
 
If the expected benefits must meet such hurdles, then gauging the benefits deserves 
special attention.  At the macro level, inferring the productivity of public spending or its 
impact on capital formation requires considering jointly the impact of additional spending 
with the cost of taxation, differentiating between spending and capital formation, and 
recognizing heterogeneity in the quality and productivity of capital. These considerations 
lead to more realistic assessments of the impact of public spending on growth.  
 
This paper highlights the need of going beyond the prescribed country specificity.  It is 
essential to consider different types of capital, and even going even further, it is essential 
to go to project level specificity.  Project-specific information, together with 
macroeconomic variables such as the marginal cost of public funds and the rate of 
discount, will determine a constellation of required rates of return that government 
projects must satisfy to have a positive impact on GDP. This is the fiscal space. 
 
At this level, performing credible and rigorous project evaluations is critical. In this 
respect, impact evaluation is a complementary tool that can provide empirical support to 
quantifying the benefits, making evaluations more robust.  From individual impact 
evaluations, public expenditure analysis has to return to the general equilibrium setting, 
to rank and choose among the alternative uses of public funds.  Only with an operational 
project evaluation system will the efficiency of public spending be enhanced. 
 
In deciding expenditure levels, composition, and efficiency enforcement, politicians will 
be involved.  Hence, institutions that will improve decision making with regards to 
spending must consider that incentives and horizons of politicians and technocrats are 
different.  Institutions that reduce fragmentation of the budget process will lead to better 
outcomes, and these will be sustainable with adequate political representation. 
Predictability and transparency of spending, with increased accountability of both 
technocrats and politicians, will lead to better outcomes of public spending. 
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Appendix 1 
The Cost of Output and Consumption Volatility in Developing Economies 
 
Several papers have shown that output growth in developing economies is more volatile than in industrial 
economies (Agenor, et.al. 2000, De Ferranti, et.al. 2000).  Fewer papers have shown that this volatility 
contrast is even stronger in household consumption, and furthermore, that consumption volatility is larger 
than output volatility in developing economies.  Only recently has research incorporating this feature in 
economic modeling (Neumeyer et.al. 2005, and Garcia, et. al., 2006). 
 
A natural question that emerges regards the welfare cost of volatility for households in developing 
countries.  The answer will basically depend on the amount of risk and the degree of risk aversion of 
households. Since Lucas’ quantification of this cost for the US (1987, 2003), there has been considerable 
development on this topic with limited application for developing countries.   The object of this note is to 
present some estimates using a variant of a simple approximation suggested by Athanasoulis and van 
Wincoop (2000).    The note is divided into three sections. The first one motivates the discussion by 
presenting data on volatility of output and consumption across the world.  The second one presents rough 
estimates of the cost of output and consumption volatility.  The third section concludes and proposes a 
work program for further refinement of these estimates. 
 
I.  Volatility of Output and Consumption across the World 
 
Table 1 shows volatility across different regions of the world.  GDP is more volatile in ECA, MENA and 
SSA.  At the regional level, only in LAC does the volatility of consumption exceed that of output (col. 7, 
Table 1).  When country-level data is examined (in the next section) this does not hold, generally. 
 
Table 1 
Output and Consumption across regions of the World,  1961- 2005 
(per capita growth rates) 
  GDP Consumption 
 (1)  (2)  (3)=(2)/(1)  (4)  (5) (6)=(1)/(2)  (7)=((5)/(2) 
  x   σ   σ / x   x   σ   σ / x   σ  con/σ  gdp 
East Asia & Pacific  5.24  4.11  0.79  4.26  2.81  0.66  0.68 
Europe & Central Asia  0.31  5.01  16.24  0.81  3.80  4.71  0.76 
European Monetary Union  2.71  2.15  0.79  2.72  2.08  0.77  0.97 
Latin America & Caribbean  1.56  2.35  1.51  1.67  2.53  1.52  1.08 
Middle East & North Africa  0.89  3.12  3.52  1.05  2.22  2.11  0.71 
South Asia  2.56  2.56  1.00  1.46  2.44  1.67  0.95 
Sub-Saharan Africa  0.61  2.11  3.45  0.53  1.69  3.21  0.80 
World 1.92  1.38  0.72  1.81  1.12  0.62  0.81 
 
 
By level of income, the HIPC countries show more aggregate volatility (Table 2).  The curious result is that 
the volatility of consumption is greater than that of output when counties are aggregated by their income 
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Table 2 
Output and Consumption across the World, by level of income 1961- 2005 
(per capita growth rates) 
  GDP Consumption 
  (1)  (2) (3)=(2)/(1) (4) (5)  (6)=(5)/(4)  (7)=(5)/(2) 
 
  x   σ   σ / x   x   σ   σ / x   σ  con/σ  gdp 
Heavily indebted poor countries 
(HIPC)  0.13 1.80  13.57 
-
0.25 2.06 -8.09  1.15 
High income  2.61  1.58  0.61  2.54 1.36  0.54  0.86 
Least developed countries: UN 
classification 0.44  1.93  4.43 
-
0.46 2.70 -5.90  1.40 
Low income  1.95  1.99  1.02  1.12 1.98  1.77  1.00 
Lower middle income  3.55  2.01 0.56  3.15 2.12  0.67  1.06 
Middle income  2.73  1.67  0.61  2.70 1.72  0.64  1.03 
Upper middle income  1.37  2.18  1.59  0.71 2.40  3.39  1.10 
World 1.92  1.38  0.72  1.81 1.12  0.62  0.81 
 
II.  Estimating the welfare cost of volatility 
 
A.  Method 
 
Most quantifications of the welfare cost of volatility are variants of the original Lucas exercise, consisting 
in estimating the expected welfare of an uncertain (risky) consumption path and comparing it with the 
welfare produced by a less risky (deterministic) consumption path.  Since the (risk-averse) consumer would 
prefer the deterministic consumption, the risky one would have to be multiplied by a factor (greater than 
one), such that the welfare implicit in the choice of the risky path is equal to the welfare level of the 
deterministic consumption.  Lucas estimated that to equalize the welfare in both cases, the compensating 
factor had to be 0.5 .  This expression is the basis for computing the welfare cost of consumption 
volatility, which depends on the degree of risk aversion (γ) and the amount of risk (
2 γσ
σ ).   
 
Lucas estimated this cost for the US economy at less than one twentieth of one percent of consumption.  
This extremely low value could be explained partly by the low risk aversion parameter and the low 
volatility of the US economy. His exercise was based on a simple constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
preference function, and on a stochastic consumption stream with deterministic mean but subject to random 
transitory disturbances.    Later contributions to this literature focused on considering different types of 
utility functions as well as stochastic consumption process with permanent shocks(Obstfeld, 1994).  The 
revised estimates were substantially larger than Lucas’, but still below or around one percent of 
consumption.  
 
Most quantifications of this cost refer to the US economy and there are some for OECD economies. There 
are very few done for developing countries, and we will use their results to benchmark the estimates 
presented in this note.  The particular application considered here, by Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (AW) 
(2000), is based on comparing the welfare implicit in a country’s risky consumption path with the welfare 
level implicit in the minimum risk consumption. The minimum risk consumption path is that which results 
when the country has diversified completely the country-specific risk, emanating from country-specific 
shocks. The minimum volatility is global, and is risk that cannot be diversified, This level is achieved when 
there is complete risk sharing across countries. The risk averse consumer would prefer the risk-sharing 
consumption path, so the individual country consumption stream would have to be multiplied by the 
compensating factor such that both welfare levels are equalized.   
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AW find that an approximation to this compensating factor is given by 0.5 ) (
2 2
σ σ γ
W i − Ω .  This formula 
is similar to Lucas’, but now the amount of risk is the difference between the individual country volatility 
and the world volatility
23, that is multiplied by a series of weights (Ω) that depend on the difference 
between the risk-free rate of interest and the risk-adjusted global growth rate.
24
 
B.  Data-  
 
Given the sizes of these variables, the key determinants of the cost will be the RRA parameter and the 
difference in volatility of endowment (consumption or output) in the country and the world aggregate.  In 
general, public finance applications use a RRA ranging from 1 to 4 (Lucas, 2003). The two applications to 
developing countries used to benchmark our results use different values. De Ferranti, et. al (2000) use 3, 
while  Pallage and Robe (2003) use a range of values from 1.5 to 10.  Athanasoulis and van Wincoop use 3, 
but report results for the representative country rather than for individual countries of their sample.  To 
facilitate comparisons with previous papers we use a RRA parameter of 3, noting that the estimate of the 
cost will be proportional to this value and facilitates sensitivity analysis to the particular assumed value..  
 
The assumption of a common RRA parameter for all countries might be somewhat restrictive, but there is 
little else to do.  Probably risk aversion could be decreasing with the level of GDP, just as risk aversion at 
the household level is found to be decreasing with the level of endowment in Italy (Guiso and Paiella, 
2003).  Other papers have found that, across households, RRA depends on the level of education, health 
and employment status of the head of household. (Eisenhauer and Ventura, 2003). Hence, it seems natural 
to assume different RRA across countries, but there is very little work in this area despite its importance 
determining saving and expenditure.  
 
As a proxy for the volatility, we used the standard deviation (σ ) of both GDP and consumption for each 
country during 1991-2005 (Table 3). Hence, the difference between the country volatility and global 
volatility is a constant, in contrast to the original AW paper where it is varying.  This leads to a 
modification of the original sum of weighted factors to a simple sum of discount factors.  
 
The discount factors are estimated for a 35-year horizon
25, and the risk free real interest rate is estimated as 
in AW: to a base value of 0.8 percent (from Mehra and Prescott), a term premium is added, constructed as 
the average difference between the t year bond yield and the one year bond yield, from 1961 to 2006, as 
reported in the Gurkaynak et.al (2006) data base. 
 
 
C.  The sample of countries 
 
The sample was selected to facilitate comparison with previous estimates.  The LAC countries are a subset 
of those reported in de Ferranti et.al., while the African countries are a subset of those in Pallage and Robe, 






                                                 
23 AW estimate country and world output volatility from growth regressions, as the variance in the growth 
innovation.  Estimates of the volatility are obtained running regressions at different horizons, hence the 
residual risk varies as the forecasting horizon changes.  






















 where r is the risk free rate and µ is the risk-
adjusted growth rate 
25 As in AW and de Feranti et.al.   54
Table 3 
Output and Consumption per capita growth in a sample of countries, 1991-2005 
  GDP   Consumption 
  x   σ   σ / x   x   σ   σ / x   σ  con/σ  gdp 
Algeria  1.02  2.90  2.85 -0.08 4.57  -57.30  1.58 
Botswana  3.70  2.09  0.57 2.18 4.58  2.10  2.19 
Egypt  2.31  1.37  0.59 2.07 1.40  0.68  1.02 
Lesotho  2.44  3.19  1.31 -0.42 7.90  -18.85  2.48 
Malawi 1.28  6.73  5.26  3.25  15.94  4.90  2.37 
Mauritius  3.70  0.95  0.26 3.74 1.09  0.29  1.15 
Morocco  1.42  5.24  3.69 0.66 6.07  9.21  1.16 
Nigeria 1.12  2.73  2.44  4.38  24.85  5.67  9.12 
South  Africa  0.80  2.66  3.32 1.43 2.80  1.96  1.05 
Sudan  3.60  1.62  0.45 1.72 9.94  5.79  6.12 
Tunisia  3.24  1.85  0.57 3.09 1.63  0.53  0.88 
Uganda  2.96  2.11  0.71 2.13 3.23  1.51  1.53 
Zimbabwe -2.54  6.01  -2.36  -2.85  12.47  -4.38  2.08 
             
Argentina  2.71  6.72  2.48 2.52 8.29  3.29  1.23 
Bolivia  1.34  1.41  1.05 0.88 1.08  1.23  0.77 
Brazil  1.03  1.96  1.90 1.58 5.63  3.57  2.87 
Chile  4.26  3.04  0.71 4.80 3.37  0.70  1.11 
Colombia  1.04  2.47  2.37 0.75 3.60  4.83  1.46 
Costa  Rica  2.38  2.62  1.10 2.27 3.32  1.46  1.27 
Ecuador  1.17  3.11  2.66 1.61 3.78  2.34  1.22 
El  Salvador  1.77  1.94  1.09 2.20 2.61  1.19  1.35 
Guatemala  1.21  1.01  0.83 1.64 0.67  0.41  0.67 
Mexico  1.51  3.18  2.11 1.76 4.00  2.28  1.26 
Nicaragua  1.09  2.41  2.22 4.27 9.67  2.26  4.02 
Paraguay -0.58  1.84  -3.19  0.49  4.52  9.15  2.45 
Peru  2.33  3.62  1.55 1.80 3.06  1.70  0.84 
Uruguay  1.75  5.67  3.25 2.44 8.37  3.44  1.48 
Venezuela 0.38  7.00  18.24  -0.09  6.33  -68.69  0.90 
Two caveats when interpreting results: 
1)  the volatility of consumption is greater than for GDP, and in some cases there are wide 
discrepancies in the same country.  This is particularly relevant in Africa. For instance, in 
Algeria, Malawi, Sudan and Nigeria, the volatility of consumption is more than twice that 
of GDP. In LAC, Brazil, Nicaragua and Paraguay show the same discrepancy. 
2)  Some countries have relatively similar volatility (σ ) but different average growth rates.  
Such is the case of GDP growth in Chile, Mexico and Ecuador, where σ  is around 3, but 
Chile’s average rate is two and three times larger, respectively, than in the other two.  To 
verify the pervasiveness of this phenomenon, we plotted the volatility measures and the 
averages  for consumption and GDP growth for the 28 countries in the sample (Graph 1), 
rejecting the existence of any statistically significant relationship between volatility and 

































Costs of Output and Consumption Volatility* 
 Output  Consumption 
Algeria 0.033  0.090 
Botswana 0.015  0.090 
Egypt 0.004  0.007 
Lesotho 0.041  0.272 
Malawi 0.195  1.117 
Mauritius 0.000  0.004 
Morocco 0.116  0.160 
Nigeria 0.029  2.704 
South Africa  0.027  0.033 
Sudan 0.008  0.431 
Tunisia 0.011  0.010 
Uganda 0.016  0.044 
Zimbawe 0.154  0.680 
Argentina 0.194  0.244 
Bolivia 0.005  0.004 
Brazil 0.013  0.137 
Chile 0.036  0.048 
Colombia 0.023  0.055 
Costa Rica  0.026  0.047 
Ecuador 0.039  0.061 
El Salvador  0.013  0.028 
Guatemala 0.001  0.000 
Mexico 0.040  0.069 
Nicaragua 0.022  0.408 
Paraguay 0.011  0.088 
Peru 0.054  0.039 
Uruguay 0.137  0.305 
Venezuela 0.211  0.174 
*Results indicate the permanent percentage increase in 
output or consumption that would produce a welfare gain 
equivalent to the reducing volatility to the global level   56
 
To verify the accuracy of the estimates based on this simplified formula, we compare our results with 
previous paper’s estimates.  In addition to the developing countries listed in Table 4, we also estimated the 




Table 5 compares the estimates based on the simplified formula with Pallage and Robe’s (2003) for a 
sample of African countries and the US.  The sample period was modified to match PR’s (1968-1996). The 
authors provide a range of estimates that vary widely depending on the specific values of the relative risk 
aversion (RRA) parameter and the assumed value of the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. We 
consider values of RRA of the order assumed in this note between 2.5 and 5, and lower values of the 
elasticity of inter-temporal substitution to report the lower and upper bounds of the PR estimates.  The 
median of the cost of consumption volatility for the whole sample of African countries in the PR paper 
oscillates between 4 and 24 percent. 
 
Table 5 
Comparison with Pallage and Robe (PR) 




estimate PR  estimates 
 lower upper
Algeria 0.174  0.004 0.16 
Egypt 0.023  0.011 0.043 
Lesotho 0.156  0.212 0.404 
Malawi 0.491  0.212 0.697 
Mauritius 0.189  0.041 0.241 
Morocco 0.099  0.017 0.045 
South Africa  0.019  0.024 0.089 
Sudan 0.101  0.163 0.407 
Tunisia 0.074  0.012 0.053 
      
USA 0.006  0.004 0.015 
 
Table 6 compares the simplified estimates of consumption volatility for a group of LAC countries with De 
Ferranti et. al. (2000).  The median cost of consumption volatility for the sample of LAC countries in the de 
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Table 6 
Comparison of Welfare cost of volatility in LAC 
countries, 1991-1999 




 Output Consumption  
      
Argentina 0.139  0.127  0.096 
Bolivia 0.008  0.003  0.000 
Brazil 0.038  0.177  0.070 
Chile 0.052  0.067 0.037 
Colombia 0.036  0.081  0.010 
Costa Rica  0.031  0.043  0.030 
Ecuador 0.038  0.042  0.000 
El 
Salvador  0.012 0.241  0.137 
Guatemala 0.000  0.003  0.003 
Mexico 0.054 0.094  0.085 
Nicaragua 0.037  0.890  0.634 
Paraguay 0.007  0.140  0.460 
Peru 0.113  0.117 0.065 
Uruguay 0.054  0.147  0.086 
Venezuela 0.093  0.078  0.065 
Table 7 compares the simplified estimates of consumption volatility costs in a group of OECD counties 
with the van Wincoop (1994) estimates for the period 1970-1988. The median of the van Wincoop 
estimates oscillates between 1.1 percent and 2.7
26.  Table 8 updates the cost estimate with a more recent 
sample and and expanded sample.  
Table 7 
Comparison of consumption volatility cost in a 
sample of OECD countries, 1970-1988 
 our  van  Wincoop 
   lower  upper 
Australia 0.001  0.008  0.019 
Canada 0.016  0.012  0.030 
Denmark 0.031  0.013  0.032 
Finland 0.022  0.014  0.033 
France 0.001  0.002  0.005 
Iceland 0.265  0.067  0.200 
Ireland 0.060  0.020  0.048 
Japan 0.024  0.007  0.017 
Norway 0.043  0.012  0.029 
Spain 0.034  0.011  0.027 
Switzerland 0.006  0.005  0.011 
United Kingdom  0.031  0.006  0.014 





The simplified formula used in the present exercise provides a useful back-of-the-envelope approximation 
to estimate the cost of volatility.  Despite its simplicity, the method yields results comparable to previous 
papers that use richer and more complicated models. Our estimates show that the developing countries in 
                                                 
26 van Wincoop’s range of values are those estimated with a RRA parameter of 4.   58
this sample could, by reducing volatility, increase the welfare of their citizens in magnitudes equivalent to a 
permanent increase in consumption of around 8 percent per year.  For the African countries in our sample, 
the potential median gain is of the order of 9 percent, while for the LAC countries it is of the order of 6 
percent.   The issue of determinants of volatility has been explored elsewhere (De Ferrranti, 2000. Ftas 
et.al. ), but most papers show that policy instability is a key factor. 
 
A fruitful line of research would be to estimate RRA parameters for each country, based on household 
surveys.   Gourinchas and Parker(2002) propose a useful methodology 
 
Table 8 
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Appendix 2 
Simple analytics of the growth effect of additional productive spending finaced with 
taxation (Adam-Bevan, 2005) 
 
This is a very brief summary of the Adam Bevan model that captures the effect of additional 
taxes to fund higher government productive spending. The main point is to  highlight that the 
effect of additional spending on growth will depend on the ratio of productivities of the public 
sectors and private sectors, the country’s debt level, and other parameters such as the average tax 




It is a two-period model with a log-utility function described as: 
 




The representative firm’s production function incorporates the possibility that marginal (α) and 
average (β) products of private capital differ, and includes positive externalities of the overall 















1-α-β = AK γp
(1-α-β)/(α+β) 
   




Abstracting from seignoriage, external grants and external debt (all considered in the original 
paper but complicate matters unnecessarily for present purposes), the government’s budget (all 
variables as a share of GDP) can be expressed as: 
 



















Where γp= Gp/Y= productive expenditure 
          γu= Gu/Y = unproductive expenditure 
          
          = debt stock at end of period t  Δt
          r= rate of interest, g= growth rate of output 
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The growth rate of output between geriods t and t+1, gt+1 is given by: 
 
gt+1 = Yt+1/Yt -1=  [AKt+1 γpt+1
(1-α-β)/(α+β)/ Yt] -1 
   
 




From the above expression, Adam_Bevan show that  a tax rate increase to finance productive 
spending will be growth enhancing if : 
 
(1-b) (1-α) [(1-τt) - γp(α+β)/
 (1-α-β)]  ≥  Δ +1 t  
 
 
With the above expression form the Adam-Bevan paper, we can gauge the order of magnitude of 
the impact of additional productive expenditure, financed with taxation, on growth. Hence we 
need parameter values for b (preference parameter), the marginal productivity of private capital 
(α ), the ratio of productive expenditure to GDP (γp)), the average elasticity of output with respect 
to private capital  (α+β),  the elasticity of output with respect to productive expenditures (1-α-β), 
and the level of public debt to GDP (Δ +1 t  ) 
Starting with the elasticity of output with respect to productive expenditure (1-α-β), discussion in 
the main text indicates that it is between .1 and .3. For the purpose of this exercise we will 
consider the upper range of values of around .4. 
The elasticity of output with respect to private capital is obtained as a product of the return to 
capital times the private capital to output ratio.  Assuming a real return of 20%, and a capital to 
output ratio of 2, then the elasticity , β,  is .4.  With β=.4 and  (1-α-β)=.4, then α=.2. 
The average tax rates of the economy can fluctuate from .2 in developing countries, to .4 in 
developed nations. 
The debt to GDP ratio can be around 40%, while in developed nations might be around 80%.  
The ratio of productive spending to GDP is assumed around 15%. 
Finally, the preference parameter, b, can be derived from observed savings rates.  The functional 
form implies a consumption of bw and a savings level of (1-b)w, with a wage rate of w
27.  With 
savings rates of about 20%, b would be around .8. 
With there parameter values the response of a change in a percentage point of productive 
expenditure can be estimated at -.3.  The negative response is fairly robust to most parameter 
variations.  When the debt ratio increases to 60% of GDP, the negative impact is larger, 




                                                 
27 This is from the footnote 8 in the Adam-Bevan paper.   61
Appendix 3 
Methods for Measuring Technical Efficiency (following Herrera and Pang 2006) 
 
The origin of the modern discussion of efficiency measurement dates back to Debreu (1951 ) and 
Farell (1957), who identified two different ways in which productive agents could be inefficient: 
one, they could use more inputs than technically required to obtain a given level of output, or two, 
they could use a sub-optimal input combination given the input prices and their marginal 
productivities. The first type of inefficiency is termed technical inefficiency while the second one 
is known as allocative inefficiency. 
 
These two types of inefficiency can be represented graphically by means of the unit isoquant 
curve in Figure1. The set of minimum inputs required for a unit of output lies on the isoquant 
curve YY’. An agent’s input-output combination defined by bundle P produces one unit of output 
using input quantities X1 and X2.  Since the same output can be achieved by consuming less of 
both inputs along the radial back to bundle R, the segment RP represents the inefficiency in 
resource utilization. The technical efficiency (TE), input-oriented, is therefore defined as TE = 
OR/OP. Furthermore, the producer could achieve additional cost reduction by choosing a 
different input combination.  The least cost combination of inputs that produces one unit of output 
is given by point T, where the marginal rate of technical substitution is equal to the input price 
ratio. To achieve this cost level implicit in the optimal combination of inputs, input use needs to 
























X1/Y   
Figure 1 Technical and Allocative Inefficiency 
 
 
The focus of this paper is measuring technical efficiency, given the lack of comparable input 
prices across the countries. This concept of efficiency is narrower than the one implicit in social 
welfare analysis. That is, countries may be producing the wrong output very efficiently (at low 
cost). We abstract from this consideration (discussed by Tanzi 2004), focusing on the narrow 
concept of efficiency. 
 
Numerous techniques have been developed over the past decades to tackle the empirical problem 
of estimating the unknown and unobservable efficient frontier (in this case the isoquant YY”).   62
These may be classified using several taxonomies. The two most widely used catalog methods 
into parametric or non-parametric, and into stochastic or deterministic. The parametric approach 
assumes a specific functional form for the relationship between the inputs and the outputs as well 
as for the inefficiency term incorporated in the deviation of the observed values from the frontier. 
The non-parametric approach calculates the frontier directly from the data without imposing 
specific functional restrictions. The first approach is based on econometric methods, while the 
second one uses mathematical programming techniques. The deterministic approach considers all 
deviations from the frontier explained by inefficiency, while the stochastic focus considers those 
deviations a combination of inefficiency and random shocks outside the control of the decision 
maker. 
 
This paper uses non-parametric methods to avoid assuming specific functional forms for the 
relationship between inputs and outputs or for the inefficiency terms. A companion paper will 
explore the parametric approach, along the lines proposed by Greene (2003). The remainder of 
the section briefly describes the two methods: the Free Disposable Hull (FDH) and the Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) 
 
The FDH method imposes the least amount of restrictions on the data, as it only assumes free-
disposability of resources.  Figure 2 illustrates the single-input single-output case of FDH 
production possibility frontier. Countries A and B use input XA and XB to produce outputs Y B A and 
YB
B, respectively. The input efficiency score for country B is defined as the quotient XA/XB. The 
output efficiency score is given by the quotient Y
B
B
B/YA. A score of one implies that the country is 
on the frontier. An input efficiency score of 0.75 indicates that this particular country uses inputs 
in excess of the most efficient producer to achieve the same output level. An output efficiency 
score of 0.75   indicates that the inefficient producer attains 75 percent of the output obtained by 
the most efficient producer with the same input intake. Multiple input and output efficiency tests 




































The second approach, Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), assumes that linear combinations of 
the observed input-output bundles are feasible. Hence it assumes convexity of the production set 
to construct an envelope around the observed combinations. Figure 3 illustrates the single input-
single output DEA production possibility frontier. In contrast to the vertical step-ups of FDH 
frontier, DEA frontier is a piecewise linear locus connecting all the efficient decision-making 
units (DMU). The feasibility assumption, displayed by the piecewise linearity, implies that the 
efficiency of C, for instance, is not only ranked against the real performers A and D, called the 
peers of C in the literature, but also evaluated with a virtual decision maker, V, which employs a 
weighted collection of A and D inputs to yield a virtual output. DMU C, which would have been 
considered to be efficient by FDH, is now lying below the variable returns to scale (VRS, further 
defined below) efficiency frontier, XADF, by DEA ranking. This example shows that FDH tends 
to assign efficiency to more DMUs than DEA does. The input-oriented technical efficiency of C 






























X  Input   
Figure 3 DEA production possibility frontier 
If constant returns to scale (CRS) characterize the production set, the frontier may be represented 
by a ray extending from the origin through the efficient DMU (ray OA). By this standard, only A 
would be rated efficient. The important feature of the XADF frontier is that this frontier reflects 
variable returns to scale. The segment XA reflects locally increasing returns to scale (IRS), that 
is, an increase in the inputs results in a greater than proportionate increase in output. Segments 
AD and DF reflect decreasing returns to scale. It is worth noticing that constant returns to scale 
technical efficiency (CRSTE) is equal to the product of variable returns to scale technical 
efficiency (VRSTE) and scale efficiency (SE). Accordingly, DMU D is technically efficient but 
scale  inefficient, while DMU C is neither technically efficient nor scale efficient. The scale 
efficiency of C is calculated as YN/YV.  For more detailed exploration of returns to scale, readers 
are referred to Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (1978) and Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (1984), 
among others.  
 
 
The limitations of the non-parametric method derive mostly from the sensitivity of the results to 
sampling variability, to the quality of the data and to the presence of outliers.  This has led recent 
literature to explore the relationship between statistical analysis and non-parametric methods   64
(Simar and Wilson, 2000). Some solutions have been advanced.  For instance, confidence 
intervals for the efficiency scores can be estimated using asymptotic theory in the single input 
case (for input-efficiency estimators) or single-output (in the output efficiency) case, given these 
are shown to be maximum likelihood estimators (Banker, 1993 and Goskpoff, 1996). For multiple 
input-output cases the distribution of the efficiency estimators is unknown or quite complicated 
and analysts recommend constructing the empirical distribution of the scores by means of 
bootstrapping methods (Simar and Wilson, 2000). Other solutions to the outlier or noisy data 
consist in constructing a frontier that does not envelop all the data point, building an expected 
minimum input function or expected maximum output functions (Cazals, Florens and Simar, 
2002, and  Wheelock and Wilson, 2003). Another limitation of the method, at least in the context 
in which  we will apply it, is the inadequate treatment of dynamics, given the lag between input 
consumption (public expenditure) and output production (health and education outcomes). 
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Appendix 4 
The rate of return of public projects and the marginal cost of public funds 
(based on Bevan, 2007) 
 
After analyzing the underlying rationale that justifies public intervention through 
specific projects or programs, the available options have to be scrutinized and the costs 
and benefits have to be evaluated. Government expenditure may produce returns of 
different types: they may be direct and financial, indirect and financial, or indirect and 
social.  The benefit-cost analysis should contemplate these differences in the impact the 
project will have on the future. Whether the project is “productive” and pays for itself 
fully in the future with the additional revenue it generates, or if it is “unproductive” and 
will not generate any future public revenue (all the return is private) will affect the 
estimation of the required rate of return to ensure that the net social benefit will be 
positive.  
To illustrate the differences between types of projects, consider three variations of 
an infinitely lived project. The cases differ according to whom the benefit accrues.  In all 
cases,  the project requires an initial cash investment of 1, which is financed by 
borrowing; project i then yields a constant flow of benefit, bi and has a constant cash 
operating cost, ci. The discount rate, r, is constant and common to both government and 
the representative private agent. The government receives revenue from an income tax at 
rate τ . This inflicts a deadweight loss on the private agent at an average rate  A θ  and a 
higher marginal rate  M θ per unit of revenue raised.  
 
Case 1: Direct financial benefits fully appropriated by the government covering the full 
cost of the project 
 
This has a benefit flow which is all appropriable by government, for example via 
user charges. To the extent that this appropriability property also held for a private 
investor, there is no necessity for the public sector to undertake the project, which could 
be left to the private sector, but it provides a useful benchmark. The present value 















, so the benefit-cost test in this 
case requires that: 
 
            ( 1 )   1 br c ≥+ 1
 
Case  2:  Indirect Financial Benefits 
 
This project produces a benefit flow that accrues entirely as additional private  
income.   However, due to taxation, public revenue increases and private benefit is 
reduced to  [ ] 2 1( 1A b τ θ −+.  If the additional public revenue is not enough to fully pay for 
the project cost ( 2 br c 2 τ <+ ), then, additional taxation equal to  22 rc b τ + −  must be   66
levied. This lowers private benefit further by  22 () ( 1 M rc b ) τ θ + −+ . Hence social net 
benefit is given by: 
[ ] [ ] 22 2 2 2 1 ( 1 ( ) ( 1)1 ( ) ( ) ( 1) AM M A br c b b r c M τ θτ θ τ θ θ −+− + − + = + − − + + θ .  
For the project to be worth undertaking, this must be non-negative. Hence the benefit-
















         ( 2 )  
 
Case 3:  Indirect Social Benefits 
 
This has a benefit flow which affects purely private utility, without any 
productive impact so that none of the benefit is monetary and hence the government does 
not capture any of the project’s return. Hence, all expenditure must be fully funded by 
additional taxation. The additional revenue flow must equal 3 ( rc ) + , imposing a cost on 
the private agent of 3 () ( 1 M rc ) θ ++ . The private (and social) net benefit flow is 
33 () ( 1 M br c ) θ −+ + . For this to be positive, the non-negativity benefit-cost condition 
becomes: 
 
  33 () ( 1) M br c θ ≥+ +          ( 3 )  
 
It is apparent that, for given c,  .   1 2 3 b b b > >
 
As an illustration of the benchmarks that these simplifications produce, Bevan (2007) 
considers a case in which  r = 0.05, and c = 0.05,  0.20, 0.20, 0.40 AM τ θθ = ==  and 
obtains  , judged to be a reasonable range.     12 3 0.10, 0.1346, 0.14 bb b ≥≥ ≥
 
 